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Rule Reference

SEC705lintai-ai-securitythreat-reviewsecuritystablejsonwarn

MCP config: screen capture

MCP configuration command captures a screenshot or desktop image

Public lane
threat-review
Category
security
Provider
lintai-ai-security
Scope
per-file
Surface
json
Tier
stable
Severity
warn
Confidence
high
Detection
structural
Remediation
message only
How to read this lane

Explicit malicious, secret-bearing, or spyware-like review.

How to read this category

Strong exploit, secret, or unsafe-execution signal.

Activation Model

Preset Activation

These presets explain where this rule appears in the product experience.

threat-reviewsidecar lane
mcpsurface preset

Lifecycle

Stable Lifecycle Contract

State

stable

Graduation rationale

Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit screen capture utilities.

Deterministic signal basis

JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for explicit screen capture utilities such as `screencapture`, `scrot`, `gnome-screenshot`, `grim`, `maim`, `grimshot`, ImageMagick `import -window root`, or PowerShell `CopyFromScreen`.

Malicious corpus
mcp-command-screen-capturemcp-command-screen-capture-exfil
Benign corpus
mcp-safe-basic
structured evidence required remediation reviewed
Canonical note

Structural stable rule positioned as an explicit threat-review control: high-signal malicious, credential-bearing, or spyware-like behavior that stays opt-in rather than shaping the quiet default.

Nearby Signals

Related Rules

SEC301MCP config: shell trampolineMCP configuration shells out through sh -c or bash -cthreat-reviewsecurityjson
SEC305Config: hardcoded auth materialConfiguration embeds static authentication material in a connection or auth valuethreat-reviewsecurityjson
SEC309Config: literal secrets in configConfiguration commits literal secret material in env, auth, or header valuesthreat-reviewsecurityjson
SEC310Config: metadata or private-network hostConfiguration endpoint targets a metadata or private-network host literalthreat-reviewsecurityjson
SEC338MCP config: sensitive host bind mountMCP configuration launches Docker with a bind mount of sensitive host materialthreat-reviewsecurityjson
SEC339MCP config: privileged Docker flagsMCP configuration launches Docker with a host-escape or privileged runtime flagthreat-reviewsecurityjson

Why It Matters ​

A committed MCP launcher that captures the desktop can silently collect visible secrets and user activity from developer machines.

What Triggers ​

SEC705 matches committed MCP command paths that invoke explicit screen capture utilities such as screencapture, scrot, gnome-screenshot, grim, grimshot, maim, ImageMagick import -window root, or PowerShell CopyFromScreen.

False Positives ​

Committed MCP launchers should not capture screenshots from user machines. If a screen capture workflow is truly needed, it should be explicit and user-driven rather than hidden in shared committed config.

Remediation ​

Remove screenshot capture behavior from the committed MCP launch path and require deliberate user action outside shared automation.