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Rule Reference

SEC651lintai-ai-securitythreat-reviewsecuritystablehookdeny

Hook script: launchd persistence

Hook script registers a launchd plist for persistence

Public lane
threat-review
Category
security
Provider
lintai-ai-security
Scope
per-file
Surface
hook
Tier
stable
Severity
deny
Confidence
high
Detection
structural
Remediation
message only
How to read this lane

Explicit malicious, secret-bearing, or spyware-like review.

How to read this category

Strong exploit, secret, or unsafe-execution signal.

Activation Model

Preset Activation

These presets explain where this rule appears in the product experience.

Lifecycle

Stable Lifecycle Contract

State

stable

Graduation rationale

Matches explicit launchd registration or LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist writes in executable hook lines.

Deterministic signal basis

HookSignals command-or-write-target detection over non-comment hook lines for `launchctl load|bootstrap` or writes to LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist paths.

Malicious corpus
hook-service-persistence
Benign corpus
cursor-plugin-clean-basic
structured evidence required remediation reviewed
Canonical note

Structural stable rule positioned as an explicit threat-review control: high-signal malicious, credential-bearing, or spyware-like behavior that stays opt-in rather than shaping the quiet default.

Nearby Signals

Related Rules

Why It Matters

Launchd registration creates persistent macOS execution outside the repository lifecycle.

What Triggers

SEC651 matches executable hook lines that run launchctl load or launchctl bootstrap, or write plist files into LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons locations.

False Positives

Machine bootstrap flows can manage launchd intentionally, but shared hooks should not silently install host persistence.

Remediation

Remove launchd registration from the hook and move plist setup into a separate reviewed admin process.