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Rule Reference

SEC660lintai-ai-securitythreat-reviewsecuritystablejsonwarn

Plugin hook: launchd persistence

Plugin hook command registers a launchd plist for persistence

Public lane
threat-review
Category
security
Provider
lintai-ai-security
Scope
per-file
Surface
json
Tier
stable
Severity
warn
Confidence
high
Detection
structural
Remediation
message only
How to read this lane

Explicit malicious, secret-bearing, or spyware-like review.

How to read this category

Strong exploit, secret, or unsafe-execution signal.

Activation Model

Preset Activation

These presets explain where this rule appears in the product experience.

Lifecycle

Stable Lifecycle Contract

State

stable

Graduation rationale

Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit launchd registration or LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist writes.

Deterministic signal basis

JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for `launchctl load|bootstrap` or writes to LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist paths.

Malicious corpus
plugin-hook-command-service-persistence
Benign corpus
plugin-hook-command-safe
structured evidence required remediation reviewed
Canonical note

Structural stable rule positioned as an explicit threat-review control: high-signal malicious, credential-bearing, or spyware-like behavior that stays opt-in rather than shaping the quiet default.

Nearby Signals

Related Rules

Why It Matters

Launchd registration from a plugin hook can install persistent macOS execution controlled by repository-delivered automation.

What Triggers

SEC660 matches plugin hook command strings that run launchctl load or launchctl bootstrap, or write plist files into LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons paths.

False Positives

Bootstrap-style plugins may intentionally manage launchd, but silent host persistence is still risky and should be explicit.

Remediation

Remove launchd persistence from the plugin hook and keep plist registration in a separate reviewed administrative setup path.