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Rule Reference

SEC654lintai-ai-securitythreat-reviewsecuritystablejsonwarn

MCP config: launchd persistence

MCP configuration command registers a launchd plist for persistence

Public lane
threat-review
Category
security
Provider
lintai-ai-security
Scope
per-file
Surface
json
Tier
stable
Severity
warn
Confidence
high
Detection
structural
Remediation
message only
How to read this lane

Explicit malicious, secret-bearing, or spyware-like review.

How to read this category

Strong exploit, secret, or unsafe-execution signal.

Activation Model

Preset Activation

These presets explain where this rule appears in the product experience.

Lifecycle

Stable Lifecycle Contract

State

stable

Graduation rationale

Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit launchd registration or LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist writes.

Deterministic signal basis

JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for `launchctl load|bootstrap` or writes to LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist paths.

Malicious corpus
mcp-command-service-persistence
Benign corpus
mcp-safe-basic
structured evidence required remediation reviewed
Canonical note

Structural stable rule positioned as an explicit threat-review control: high-signal malicious, credential-bearing, or spyware-like behavior that stays opt-in rather than shaping the quiet default.

Nearby Signals

Related Rules

Why It Matters

Launchd registration from shared MCP config can establish persistent macOS execution controlled through the repository.

What Triggers

SEC654 matches MCP command definitions that run launchctl load or launchctl bootstrap, or write plist files into LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons locations.

False Positives

Provisioning servers may manage launchd intentionally, but that should remain explicit and reviewed.

Remediation

Remove launchd persistence from the MCP config and keep plist installation outside ordinary shared server launch paths.