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Rule Reference

SEC697lintai-ai-securitythreat-reviewsecuritystablejsonwarn

MCP config: clipboard exfiltration

MCP configuration command exfiltrates clipboard contents over the network

Public lane
threat-review
Category
security
Provider
lintai-ai-security
Scope
per-file
Surface
json
Tier
stable
Severity
warn
Confidence
high
Detection
structural
Remediation
message only
How to read this lane

Explicit malicious, secret-bearing, or spyware-like review.

How to read this category

Strong exploit, secret, or unsafe-execution signal.

Activation Model

Preset Activation

These presets explain where this rule appears in the product experience.

threat-reviewsidecar lane
mcpsurface preset

Lifecycle

Stable Lifecycle Contract

State

stable

Graduation rationale

Checks committed MCP launch paths for clipboard-reading commands that also transmit captured data to remote destinations.

Deterministic signal basis

JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for clipboard read utilities such as `pbpaste`, `wl-paste`, `xclip -o`, `xsel --output`, or PowerShell `Get-Clipboard` combined with remote sinks such as `curl`, `wget`, `scp`, `rsync`, `nc`, or HTTP(S) endpoints.

Malicious corpus
mcp-command-local-data-exfil
Benign corpus
mcp-safe-basic
structured evidence required remediation reviewed
Canonical note

Structural stable rule positioned as an explicit threat-review control: high-signal malicious, credential-bearing, or spyware-like behavior that stays opt-in rather than shaping the quiet default.

Nearby Signals

Related Rules

SEC301MCP config: shell trampolineMCP configuration shells out through sh -c or bash -cthreat-reviewsecurityjson
SEC305Config: hardcoded auth materialConfiguration embeds static authentication material in a connection or auth valuethreat-reviewsecurityjson
SEC309Config: literal secrets in configConfiguration commits literal secret material in env, auth, or header valuesthreat-reviewsecurityjson
SEC310Config: metadata or private-network hostConfiguration endpoint targets a metadata or private-network host literalthreat-reviewsecurityjson
SEC338MCP config: sensitive host bind mountMCP configuration launches Docker with a bind mount of sensitive host materialthreat-reviewsecurityjson
SEC339MCP config: privileged Docker flagsMCP configuration launches Docker with a host-escape or privileged runtime flagthreat-reviewsecurityjson

Why It Matters ​

A committed MCP launcher that reads and transmits clipboard contents can silently steal copied secrets whenever the tool is invoked.

What Triggers ​

SEC697 matches committed MCP command paths that combine clipboard-reading utilities such as pbpaste, wl-paste, xclip -o, xsel --output, or PowerShell Get-Clipboard with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.

False Positives ​

Committed MCP launchers should not read and transmit clipboard contents. If clipboard input is genuinely needed, it should happen through explicit user interaction rather than a shared committed command.

Remediation ​

Remove network exfiltration of clipboard contents from the committed MCP launch path and require explicit input instead of harvesting local clipboard state.