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Rule Reference

SEC706lintai-ai-securitystablejsonwarn

MCP config: screen capture exfiltration

MCP configuration command captures and exfiltrates a screenshot or desktop image

Provider
lintai-ai-security
Surface
json
Scope
per_file
Tier
stable
Severity
warn
Confidence
high
Detection
structural
Remediation
message_only

Activation Model

Preset Membership

This rule is part of the builtin activation graph through these preset memberships.

basemembership
mcpmembership

Lifecycle

Stable Lifecycle Contract

State

stable_gated

Graduation rationale

Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit screen capture utilities combined with remote transfer behavior.

Deterministic signal basis

JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for explicit screen capture utilities such as `screencapture`, `scrot`, `gnome-screenshot`, `grim`, `maim`, `grimshot`, ImageMagick `import -window root`, or PowerShell `CopyFromScreen`, combined with remote sinks such as `curl`, `wget`, `scp`, `rsync`, `nc`, or HTTP(S) endpoints.

Malicious corpus
mcp-command-screen-capture-exfil
Benign corpus
mcp-safe-basic
structured evidence required remediation reviewed
Canonical note

Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

Nearby Signals

Related Rules

SEC301MCP config: shell trampolineMCP configuration shells out through sh -c or bash -cjsonstable
SEC302Config: insecure HTTP endpointConfiguration contains an insecure http:// endpointjsonstable
SEC303MCP config: credential env passthroughMCP configuration passes through credential environment variablesjsonstable
SEC304Config: TLS verification disabledConfiguration disables TLS or certificate verificationjsonstable
SEC305Config: hardcoded auth materialConfiguration embeds static authentication material in a connection or auth valuejsonstable
SEC309Config: literal secrets in configConfiguration commits literal secret material in env, auth, or header valuesjsonstable

Why It Matters ​

Capturing the desktop and sending it off-host from a committed MCP launcher is explicit surveillance and theft behavior.

What Triggers ​

SEC706 matches committed MCP command paths that invoke explicit screen capture utilities such as screencapture, scrot, gnome-screenshot, grim, grimshot, maim, ImageMagick import -window root, or PowerShell CopyFromScreen, and also transmit data to remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.

False Positives ​

Committed MCP launchers should not capture and transmit screenshots. Legitimate sharing should require deliberate user intent instead of hidden committed automation.

Remediation ​

Remove screenshot capture and remote transfer behavior from the committed MCP launch path and keep screen data local unless the user explicitly chooses to share it.