Skip to content

Security Rules Catalog

Generated file. Do not edit by hand. Source: lintai-cli shipped rule inventory aggregated from provider catalogs.

Canonical catalog for the shipped security rules currently exposed by:

  • lintai-ai-security
  • lintai-policy-mismatch
  • lintai-dep-vulns

Summary

CodeSummaryPublic LaneTierLifecycleSeverityScopeSurfaceDetectionRemediationPresets
SEC101 / MD-HIDDEN-INSTRUCTIONSHidden HTML comment contains dangerous agent instructionspreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownheuristicsafe_fixpreview, skills
SEC102 / MD-DOWNLOAD-EXECMarkdown contains remote download-and-execute instruction outside code blockspreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownheuristicsuggestionpreview, skills
SEC103 / MD-HIDDEN-DOWNLOAD-EXECHidden HTML comment contains remote download-and-execute instructionpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownheuristicsafe_fixpreview, skills
SEC104 / MD-BASE64-EXECMarkdown contains a base64-decoded executable payload outside code blockspreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownheuristicmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC105 / MD-PATH-TRAVERSALMarkdown instructions reference parent-directory traversal for file accesspreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownheuristicmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC201 / HOOK-DOWNLOAD-EXECHook script downloads remote code and executes itpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralsuggestionbase
SEC202 / HOOK-SECRET-EXFILHook script appears to exfiltrate secrets through a network callpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralsuggestionbase
SEC203 / HOOK-PLAIN-HTTP-SECRET-EXFILHook script sends secret material to an insecure http:// endpointpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralsuggestionbase
SEC204 / HOOK-TLS-BYPASSHook script disables TLS or certificate verification for a network callpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC205 / HOOK-STATIC-AUTHHook script embeds static authentication material in a network callpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC206 / HOOK-BASE64-EXECHook script decodes a base64 payload and executes itpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralsuggestionbase
SEC301 / MCP-SHELL-WRAPPERMCP configuration shells out through sh -c or bash -cpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC302 / MCP-PLAIN-HTTP-ENDPOINTConfiguration contains an insecure http:// endpointpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralsuggestionbase, mcp
SEC303 / MCP-CREDENTIAL-ENV-PASSTHROUGHMCP configuration passes through credential environment variablespreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC304 / MCP-TLS-BYPASSConfiguration disables TLS or certificate verificationpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC305 / MCP-STATIC-AUTHConfiguration embeds static authentication material in a connection or auth valuepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC306 / MCP-HIDDEN-INSTRUCTIONSJSON configuration description contains override-style hidden instructionspreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filejsonheuristicmessage_onlypreview, mcp
SEC307 / MCP-SENSITIVE-ENV-REFERENCEConfiguration forwards sensitive environment variable referencespreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filejsonheuristicmessage_onlypreview, mcp
SEC308 / MCP-SUSPICIOUS-ENDPOINTConfiguration points at a suspicious remote endpointpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filejsonheuristicmessage_onlypreview, mcp
SEC309 / MCP-LITERAL-SECRETConfiguration commits literal secret material in env, auth, or header valuespreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC310 / MCP-METADATA-HOST-LITERALConfiguration endpoint targets a metadata or private-network host literalpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC311 / PLUGIN-UNSAFE-PATHCursor plugin manifest contains an unsafe absolute or parent-traversing pathpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC312 / MD-PRIVATE-KEYMarkdown contains committed private key materialpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlybase, skills
SEC313 / MD-PIPE-SHELLFenced shell example pipes remote content directly into a shellpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC314 / TOOL-MISSING-MACHINE-FIELDSMCP-style tool descriptor is missing required machine fieldspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filetool_jsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC315 / TOOL-DUPLICATE-NAMESMCP-style tool descriptor collection contains duplicate tool namespreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filetool_jsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC316 / OPENAI-STRICT-ADDITIONAL-PROPERTIESOpenAI strict tool schema omits recursive additionalProperties: falsepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filetool_jsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC317 / OPENAI-STRICT-REQUIRED-COVERAGEOpenAI strict tool schema does not require every declared propertypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filetool_jsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC318 / ANTHROPIC-STRICT-ADDITIONAL-PROPERTIESAnthropic strict tool input schema omits additionalProperties: falsepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filetool_jsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC319 / SERVER-REMOTE-URLserver.json remotes entry uses an insecure or non-public remote URLpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileserver_jsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC320 / SERVER-UNDEFINED-URL-VARserver.json remotes URL references an undefined template variablepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileserver_jsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC321 / SERVER-LITERAL-AUTH-HEADERserver.json remotes header commits literal authentication materialpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileserver_jsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC322 / SERVER-UNDEFINED-HEADER-VARserver.json remotes header value references an undefined template variablepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileserver_jsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC323 / SERVER-AUTH-SECRET-FLAGserver.json auth header carries material without an explicit secret flagpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_fileserver_jsonstructuralmessage_onlypreview, mcp
SEC324 / GHA-UNPINNED-ACTIONGitHub Actions workflow uses a third-party action that is not pinned to a full commit SHArecommendedStablestable_gatedWarnper_filegithub_workflowstructuralmessage_onlyrecommended, supply-chain
SEC325 / GHA-UNTRUSTED-RUN-INTERPOLATIONGitHub Actions workflow interpolates untrusted expression data directly inside a run commandpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filegithub_workflowstructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC326 / GHA-PR-TARGET-HEAD-CHECKOUTGitHub Actions pull_request_target workflow checks out untrusted pull request head contentpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filegithub_workflowstructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC327 / GHA-WRITE-ALL-PERMISSIONSGitHub Actions workflow grants GITHUB_TOKEN write-all permissionspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filegithub_workflowstructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC328 / GHA-WRITE-CAPABLE-THIRD-PARTY-ACTIONGitHub Actions workflow combines explicit write-capable permissions with a third-party actionrecommendedPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filegithub_workflowstructuralmessage_onlyrecommended, supply-chain
SEC329 / MCP-MUTABLE-LAUNCHERMCP configuration launches tooling through a mutable package runnerrecommendedStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlyrecommended, base, mcp
SEC330 / MCP-DOWNLOAD-EXECMCP configuration command downloads remote content and pipes it into a shellpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC331 / MCP-TLS-BYPASSMCP configuration command disables TLS verification in a network-capable execution pathpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC335 / MD-METADATA-SERVICE-ACCESSAI-native markdown contains a direct cloud metadata-service access examplepreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC336 / MCP-BROAD-ENVFILERepo-local MCP client config loads a broad dotenv-style envFilepreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlypreview, mcp
SEC337 / MCP-DOCKER-UNPINNED-IMAGEMCP configuration launches Docker with an image reference that is not digest-pinnedpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC338 / MCP-DOCKER-SENSITIVE-MOUNTMCP configuration launches Docker with a bind mount of sensitive host materialpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC339 / MCP-DOCKER-HOST-ESCAPEMCP configuration launches Docker with a host-escape or privileged runtime flagpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC340 / CLAUDE-HOOK-MUTABLE-LAUNCHERClaude settings command hook uses a mutable package launcherrecommendedStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlyrecommended, base, claude
SEC341 / CLAUDE-HOOK-DOWNLOAD-EXECClaude settings command hook downloads remote content and pipes it into a shellpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC342 / CLAUDE-HOOK-TLS-BYPASSClaude settings command hook disables TLS verification in a network-capable execution pathpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC343 / PLUGIN-HOOK-MUTABLE-LAUNCHERPlugin hook command uses a mutable package launcherpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC344 / PLUGIN-HOOK-DOWNLOAD-EXECPlugin hook command downloads remote content and pipes it into a shellpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC345 / PLUGIN-HOOK-TLS-BYPASSPlugin hook command disables TLS verification in a network-capable execution pathpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC346 / MCP-DOCKER-PULL-ALWAYSMCP configuration forces Docker to refresh from a mutable registry sourcepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC347 / MD-MCP-MUTABLE-LAUNCHERAI-native markdown example launches MCP through a mutable package runnerrecommendedPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlyrecommended, preview, skills
SEC348 / MD-DOCKER-MUTABLE-IMAGEAI-native markdown Docker example uses a mutable registry imagepreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC349 / MD-DOCKER-HOST-ESCAPEAI-native markdown Docker example uses a host-escape or privileged runtime patternpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC350 / MD-UNTRUSTED-INSTRUCTION-PROMOTIONInstruction markdown promotes untrusted external content to developer/system-level instructionspreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownheuristicmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC351 / MD-APPROVAL-BYPASSAI-native instruction explicitly disables user approval or confirmationpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownheuristicmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC352 / MD-UNSCOPED-BASHAI-native markdown frontmatter grants unscoped Bash tool accessrecommendedStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlyrecommended, preview, skills
SEC353 / COPILOT-4KGitHub Copilot instruction markdown exceeds the 4000-character guidance limitpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlyguidance
SEC354 / COPILOT-PATH-APPLYTOPath-specific GitHub Copilot instruction markdown is missing applyTo frontmatterpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlyguidance
SEC355 / MD-WILDCARD-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants wildcard tool accesspreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC356 / PLUGIN-AGENT-PERMISSIONMODEPlugin agent frontmatter sets permissionModepreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC357 / PLUGIN-AGENT-HOOKSPlugin agent frontmatter sets hookspreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC358 / PLUGIN-AGENT-MCPSERVERSPlugin agent frontmatter sets mcpServerspreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC359 / CURSOR-RULE-ALWAYSAPPLYCursor rule frontmatter alwaysApply must be booleanpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC360 / CURSOR-RULE-GLOBSCursor rule frontmatter globs must be a sequence of patternspreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC361 / CLAUDE-SETTINGS-SCHEMAClaude settings file is missing a top-level $schema referencepreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC362 / CLAUDE-BASH-WILDCARDClaude settings permissions allow Bash(*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC363 / CLAUDE-HOME-HOOK-PATHClaude settings hook command uses a home-directory path in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC364 / CLAUDE-BYPASS-PERMISSIONSClaude settings set permissions.defaultMode to bypassPermissions in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC365 / CLAUDE-HTTP-HOOK-URLClaude settings allow non-HTTPS HTTP hook URLs in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC366 / CLAUDE-HTTP-HOOK-HOSTClaude settings allow dangerous host literals in allowedHttpHookUrlspreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC367 / CLAUDE-WEBFETCH-WILDCARDClaude settings permissions allow WebFetch(*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC368 / CLAUDE-ABS-HOOK-PATHClaude settings hook command uses a repo-external absolute path in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC369 / CLAUDE-WRITE-WILDCARDClaude settings permissions allow Write(*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC370 / COPILOT-PATH-SUFFIXPath-specific GitHub Copilot instruction markdown under .github/instructions/ uses the wrong file suffixpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlyguidance
SEC371 / COPILOT-APPLYTO-TYPEPath-specific GitHub Copilot instruction markdown has an invalid applyTo shapepreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlyguidance
SEC372 / CLAUDE-READ-WILDCARDClaude settings permissions allow Read(*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC373 / CLAUDE-EDIT-WILDCARDClaude settings permissions allow Edit(*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC374 / CLAUDE-WEBSEARCH-WILDCARDClaude settings permissions allow WebSearch(*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC375 / CLAUDE-GLOB-WILDCARDClaude settings permissions allow Glob(*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC376 / CLAUDE-GREP-WILDCARDClaude settings permissions allow Grep(*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC377 / COPILOT-APPLYTO-GLOBPath-specific GitHub Copilot instruction markdown has an invalid applyTo glob patternpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlyguidance
SEC378 / CURSOR-ALWAYSAPPLY-GLOBSCursor rule frontmatter should not set globs when alwaysApply is truepreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC379 / CURSOR-UNKNOWN-FRONTMATTERCursor rule frontmatter contains an unknown keypreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC380 / CURSOR-DESCRIPTIONCursor rule frontmatter should include descriptionpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC381 / CLAUDE-HOOK-TIMEOUTClaude settings command hook should set timeout in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC382 / CLAUDE-HOOK-MATCHER-EVENTClaude settings should not use matcher on unsupported hook eventspreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC383 / CLAUDE-HOOK-MISSING-MATCHERClaude settings should set matcher on matcher-capable hook eventspreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC384 / CLAUDE-WEBSEARCH-UNSCOPEDClaude settings permissions allow bare WebSearch in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC385 / CLAUDE-GIT-PUSH-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git push) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC386 / CLAUDE-GIT-CHECKOUT-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git checkout:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC387 / CLAUDE-GIT-COMMIT-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git commit:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC388 / CLAUDE-GIT-STASH-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git stash:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC389 / MD-WEBSEARCH-UNSCOPEDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare WebSearch tool accesspreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC390 / MD-GIT-PUSH-PERMISSIONAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git push) tool accessgovernancePreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC391 / MD-GIT-CHECKOUT-PERMISSIONAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git checkout:*) tool accessgovernancePreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC392 / MD-GIT-COMMIT-PERMISSIONAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git commit:*) tool accessgovernancePreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC393 / MD-GIT-STASH-PERMISSIONAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git stash:*) tool accessgovernancePreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC394 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WILDCARDMCP configuration auto-approves all tools with autoApprove: ["*"]previewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC395 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-TOOLSMCP configuration auto-approves all tools with autoApproveTools: truepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC396 / MCP-TRUST-TOOLSMCP configuration fully trusts tools with trustTools: truepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC397 / MCP-SANDBOX-DISABLEDMCP configuration disables sandboxing with sandbox: false or disableSandbox: truepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC398 / MCP-CAPABILITIES-WILDCARDMCP configuration grants all capabilities with capabilities: ["*"] or capabilities: "*"previewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC399 / CLAUDE-NPX-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(npx ...) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC400 / CLAUDE-ENABLED-MCPJSON-SERVERSClaude settings enable enabledMcpjsonServers in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC401 / POLICY-EXEC-MISMATCHProject policy forbids execution, but repository contains executable behaviorpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnworkspaceworkspacestructuralnonecompat
SEC402 / POLICY-NETWORK-MISMATCHProject policy forbids network access, but repository contains network behaviorpreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnworkspaceworkspacestructuralnonecompat
SEC403 / POLICY-SKILL-CAPABILITIES-MISMATCHSkill frontmatter capabilities conflict with project policypreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnworkspaceworkspacestructuralnonecompat
SEC404 / MD-WEBFETCH-UNSCOPEDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare WebFetch tool accesspreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC405 / CLAUDE-PACKAGE-INSTALL-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow package installation commands in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC406 / CLAUDE-GIT-ADD-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git add:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC407 / CLAUDE-GIT-CLONE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git clone:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC408 / CLAUDE-GH-PR-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh pr:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC409 / CLAUDE-GIT-FETCH-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git fetch:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC410 / CLAUDE-GIT-LS-REMOTE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git ls-remote:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC411 / CLAUDE-CURL-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(curl:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC412 / CLAUDE-WGET-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(wget:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC413 / CLAUDE-GIT-CONFIG-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git config:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC414 / CLAUDE-GIT-TAG-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git tag:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC415 / CLAUDE-GIT-BRANCH-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git branch:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC416 / MD-CLAUDE-PIP-INSTALLAI-native markdown models Claude package installation with bare pip install despite explicit uv preference guidancepreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnper_filemarkdownheuristicmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC417 / MD-PIP-GIT-UNPINNEDAI-native markdown installs Python packages from an unpinned git+https:// sourcepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC418 / CLAUDE-WEBFETCH-RAW-GITHUBClaude settings permissions allow WebFetch(domain:raw.githubusercontent.com) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC419 / MD-CURL-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(curl:*) authoritypreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC420 / MD-WGET-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(wget:*) authoritypreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC421 / MD-GIT-CLONE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git clone:*) authoritypreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC422 / MCP-COMMAND-SUDOMCP configuration launches the server through sudopreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC423 / MD-READ-UNSCOPEDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare Read tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC424 / MD-WRITE-UNSCOPEDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare Write tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC425 / MD-EDIT-UNSCOPEDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare Edit tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC426 / MD-GLOB-UNSCOPEDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare Glob tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC427 / MD-GREP-UNSCOPEDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare Grep tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC428 / MD-READ-UNSAFE-PATHAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Read(...) over an unsafe repo-external pathpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC429 / MD-WRITE-UNSAFE-PATHAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Write(...) over an unsafe repo-external pathpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC430 / MD-EDIT-UNSAFE-PATHAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Edit(...) over an unsafe repo-external pathpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC431 / MD-GLOB-UNSAFE-PATHAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Glob(...) over an unsafe repo-external pathpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC432 / MD-GIT-ADD-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git add:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC433 / MD-GIT-FETCH-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git fetch:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC434 / MD-WEBFETCH-RAW-GITHUBAI-native markdown frontmatter grants WebFetch(domain:raw.githubusercontent.com) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC435 / MD-GIT-CONFIG-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git config:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC436 / MD-GIT-TAG-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git tag:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC437 / MD-GIT-BRANCH-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git branch:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC438 / MD-GIT-RESET-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git reset:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC439 / MD-GIT-CLEAN-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git clean:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC440 / MD-GIT-RESTORE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git restore:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC441 / MD-GIT-REBASE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git rebase:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC442 / MD-GIT-MERGE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git merge:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC443 / MD-GIT-CHERRY-PICK-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git cherry-pick:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC444 / MD-GIT-APPLY-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git apply:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC445 / MD-GIT-AM-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git am:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC446 / MCP-ARGS-SUDOMCP configuration passes sudo as the first launch argumentpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC447 / MD-PACKAGE-INSTALL-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants package installation authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC448 / MD-PIP-TRUSTED-HOSTAI-native markdown installs Python packages with --trusted-hostpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC449 / MD-PIP-HTTP-INDEXAI-native markdown installs Python packages from an insecure http:// package indexpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC450 / MD-NPM-HTTP-REGISTRYAI-native markdown installs JavaScript packages from an insecure http:// registrypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC451 / MD-CARGO-HTTP-GIT-INSTALLAI-native markdown installs Rust packages from an insecure http:// git sourcepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC452 / MD-CARGO-HTTP-INDEXAI-native markdown installs Rust packages from an insecure http:// indexpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC453 / MD-PIP-HTTP-SOURCEAI-native markdown installs Python packages from an insecure direct http:// sourcepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC454 / MD-NPM-HTTP-SOURCEAI-native markdown installs JavaScript packages from an insecure direct http:// sourcepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC455 / MD-PIP-HTTP-GIT-INSTALLAI-native markdown installs Python packages from an insecure git+http:// sourcepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC456 / MD-PIP-HTTP-FIND-LINKSAI-native markdown installs Python packages with insecure http:// find-linkspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC457 / MD-JS-PACKAGE-STRICT-SSL-FALSEAI-native markdown disables strict SSL verification for JavaScript package manager configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC458 / MD-PIP-CONFIG-HTTP-INDEXAI-native markdown configures Python package resolution with an insecure http:// package indexpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC459 / MD-JS-PACKAGE-CONFIG-HTTP-REGISTRYAI-native markdown configures a JavaScript package manager with an insecure http:// registrypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC460 / MD-PIP-CONFIG-HTTP-FIND-LINKSAI-native markdown configures Python package discovery with insecure http:// find-linkspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC461 / MD-PIP-CONFIG-TRUSTED-HOSTAI-native markdown configures Python package resolution with trusted-hostpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC462 / MD-NETWORK-TLS-BYPASSAI-native markdown disables TLS verification for a network-capable commandpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC463 / MD-SUDO-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(sudo:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC464 / MD-GIT-HTTP-CLONEAI-native markdown clones a Git repository from an insecure http:// sourcepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC465 / MD-GIT-HTTP-REMOTEAI-native markdown configures a Git remote with an insecure http:// sourcepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC466 / MD-RM-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(rm:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC467 / MD-CHMOD-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(chmod:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC468 / MD-CHOWN-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(chown:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC469 / MD-CHGRP-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(chgrp:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC470 / MD-SU-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(su:*) authoritypreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC471 / MD-GIT-SSLVERIFY-FALSEAI-native markdown disables Git TLS verification with http.sslVerify falsepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC472 / MD-GIT-SSL-NO-VERIFYAI-native markdown disables Git TLS verification with GIT_SSL_NO_VERIFYpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC473 / MD-GIT-INLINE-SSLVERIFY-FALSEAI-native markdown disables Git TLS verification with git -c http.sslVerify=falsepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC474 / MD-GH-PR-PERMISSIONAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh pr:*) tool accessgovernancePreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC475 / CLAUDE-READ-UNSAFE-PATHClaude settings permissions allow Read(...) over an unsafe path in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC476 / CLAUDE-WRITE-UNSAFE-PATHClaude settings permissions allow Write(...) over an unsafe path in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC477 / CLAUDE-EDIT-UNSAFE-PATHClaude settings permissions allow Edit(...) over an unsafe path in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC478 / CLAUDE-GIT-RESET-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git reset:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC479 / CLAUDE-GIT-CLEAN-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git clean:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC480 / CLAUDE-GIT-RESTORE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git restore:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC481 / CLAUDE-GIT-REBASE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git rebase:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC482 / CLAUDE-GIT-MERGE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git merge:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC483 / CLAUDE-GIT-CHERRY-PICK-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git cherry-pick:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC484 / CLAUDE-GIT-APPLY-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git apply:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC485 / CLAUDE-GIT-AM-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(git am:*) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC486 / CLAUDE-GLOB-UNSAFE-PATHClaude settings permissions allow Glob(...) over an unsafe path in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC487 / CLAUDE-GREP-UNSAFE-PATHClaude settings permissions allow Grep(...) over an unsafe path in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC488 / CLAUDE-UVX-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(uvx ...) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC489 / CLAUDE-PNPM-DLX-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(pnpm dlx ...) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC490 / CLAUDE-YARN-DLX-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(yarn dlx ...) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC491 / CLAUDE-PIPX-RUN-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(pipx run ...) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC492 / CLAUDE-NPM-EXEC-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(npm exec ...) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC493 / CLAUDE-BUNX-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(bunx ...) in a shared committed configpreviewPreviewstable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC494 / MD-NPM-EXEC-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(npm exec:*) tool accessgovernancePreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC495 / MD-BUNX-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(bunx:*) tool accessgovernancePreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC496 / MD-UVX-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(uvx:*) tool accessgovernancePreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC497 / MD-PNPM-DLX-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(pnpm dlx:*) tool accessgovernancePreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC498 / MD-YARN-DLX-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(yarn dlx:*) tool accessgovernancePreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC499 / MD-PIPX-RUN-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(pipx run:*) tool accessgovernancePreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC500 / MD-NPX-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(npx:*) tool accessgovernancePreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC501 / MD-GIT-LS-REMOTE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git ls-remote:*) tool accessgovernancePreviewstable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC502 / CLAUDE-GH-API-POST-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh api --method POST:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC503 / CLAUDE-GH-ISSUE-CREATE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh issue create:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC504 / CLAUDE-GH-REPO-CREATE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh repo create:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC505 / MD-GH-API-POST-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh api --method POST:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC506 / MD-GH-ISSUE-CREATE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh issue create:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC507 / MD-GH-REPO-CREATE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh repo create:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC508 / CLAUDE-GH-SECRET-SET-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh secret set:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC509 / CLAUDE-GH-VARIABLE-SET-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh variable set:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC510 / CLAUDE-GH-WORKFLOW-RUN-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh workflow run:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC511 / MD-GH-SECRET-SET-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh secret set:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC512 / MD-GH-VARIABLE-SET-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh variable set:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC513 / MD-GH-WORKFLOW-RUN-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh workflow run:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC514 / CLAUDE-GH-SECRET-DELETE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh secret delete:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC515 / CLAUDE-GH-VARIABLE-DELETE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh variable delete:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC516 / CLAUDE-GH-WORKFLOW-DISABLE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh workflow disable:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC517 / MD-GH-SECRET-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh secret delete:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC518 / MD-GH-VARIABLE-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh variable delete:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC519 / MD-GH-WORKFLOW-DISABLE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh workflow disable:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC520 / MD-READ-WILDCARDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Read(*) wildcard accesspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC521 / MD-WRITE-WILDCARDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Write(*) wildcard accesspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC522 / MD-EDIT-WILDCARDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Edit(*) wildcard accesspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC523 / MD-GLOB-WILDCARDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Glob(*) wildcard accesspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC524 / MD-GREP-WILDCARDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Grep(*) wildcard accesspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC525 / MD-WEBFETCH-WILDCARDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants WebFetch(*) wildcard accesspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC526 / MD-WEBSEARCH-WILDCARDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants WebSearch(*) wildcard accesspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC527 / MD-BASH-WILDCARDAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(*) wildcard accesspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlypreview, skills
SEC528 / CLAUDE-GH-API-DELETE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh api --method DELETE:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC529 / MD-GH-API-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh api --method DELETE:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC530 / CLAUDE-GH-API-PATCH-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh api --method PATCH:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC531 / CLAUDE-GH-API-PUT-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh api --method PUT:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC532 / MD-GH-API-PATCH-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh api --method PATCH:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC533 / MD-GH-API-PUT-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh api --method PUT:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC534 / CLAUDE-GH-REPO-DELETE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh repo delete:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC535 / MD-GH-REPO-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh repo delete:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC536 / CLAUDE-GH-RELEASE-DELETE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh release delete:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC537 / MD-GH-RELEASE-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh release delete:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC538 / CLAUDE-GH-REPO-EDIT-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh repo edit:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC539 / MD-GH-REPO-EDIT-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh repo edit:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC540 / CLAUDE-GH-RELEASE-CREATE-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh release create:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC541 / MD-GH-RELEASE-CREATE-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh release create:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC542 / CLAUDE-GH-REPO-TRANSFER-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh repo transfer:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC543 / MD-GH-REPO-TRANSFER-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh repo transfer:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC544 / CLAUDE-GH-RELEASE-UPLOAD-PERMISSIONClaude settings permissions allow Bash(gh release upload:*) in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC545 / MD-GH-RELEASE-UPLOAD-ALLOWED-TOOLSAI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh release upload:*) tool accessgovernanceStablestable_gatedWarnper_filemarkdownstructuralmessage_onlygovernance
SEC546 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-BASH-WILDCARDMCP configuration auto-approves blanket shell execution with autoApprove: ["Bash(*)"]previewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC547 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CURLMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(curl:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC548 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WGETMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(wget:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC549 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-SUDOMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(sudo:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC550 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-RMMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(rm:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC551 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-PUSHMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git push) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC552 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-API-POSTMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh api --method POST:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC553 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CHECKOUTMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git checkout:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC554 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-COMMITMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git commit:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC555 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-RESETMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git reset:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC556 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CLEANMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git clean:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC557 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-API-DELETEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh api --method DELETE:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC558 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-API-PATCHMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh api --method PATCH:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC559 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-API-PUTMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh api --method PUT:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC560 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-ISSUE-CREATEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh issue create:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC561 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-REPO-CREATEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh repo create:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC562 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-REPO-DELETEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh repo delete:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC563 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-REPO-EDITMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh repo edit:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC564 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-SECRET-SETMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh secret set:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC565 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-VARIABLE-SETMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh variable set:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC566 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-WORKFLOW-RUNMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh workflow run:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC567 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-READ-WILDCARDMCP configuration auto-approves Read(*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC568 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WRITE-WILDCARDMCP configuration auto-approves Write(*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC569 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-EDIT-WILDCARDMCP configuration auto-approves Edit(*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC570 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GLOB-WILDCARDMCP configuration auto-approves Glob(*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC571 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GREP-WILDCARDMCP configuration auto-approves Grep(*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC572 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBFETCH-WILDCARDMCP configuration auto-approves WebFetch(*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC573 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBSEARCH-WILDCARDMCP configuration auto-approves WebSearch(*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC574 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-READ-UNSAFE-PATHMCP configuration auto-approves Read(...) over an unsafe path through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC575 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WRITE-UNSAFE-PATHMCP configuration auto-approves Write(...) over an unsafe path through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC576 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-EDIT-UNSAFE-PATHMCP configuration auto-approves Edit(...) over an unsafe path through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC577 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GLOB-UNSAFE-PATHMCP configuration auto-approves Glob(...) over an unsafe path through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC578 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GREP-UNSAFE-PATHMCP configuration auto-approves Grep(...) over an unsafe path through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC579 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-SECRET-DELETEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh secret delete:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC580 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-VARIABLE-DELETEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh variable delete:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC581 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-WORKFLOW-DISABLEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh workflow disable:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC582 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-REPO-TRANSFERMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh repo transfer:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC583 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-RELEASE-CREATEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh release create:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC584 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-RELEASE-DELETEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh release delete:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC585 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-RELEASE-UPLOADMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh release upload:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC586 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-NPXMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(npx ...) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC587 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-UVXMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(uvx ...) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC588 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-NPM-EXECMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(npm exec ...) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC589 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-BUNXMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(bunx ...) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC590 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-PNPM-DLXMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(pnpm dlx ...) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC591 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-YARN-DLXMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(yarn dlx ...) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC592 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-PIPX-RUNMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(pipx run ...) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC593 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-PACKAGE-INSTALLMCP configuration auto-approves package installation commands through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC594 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CLONEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git clone:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC595 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-FETCHMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git fetch:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC596 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-LS-REMOTEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git ls-remote:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC597 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-ADDMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git add:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC598 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CONFIGMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git config:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC599 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-TAGMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git tag:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC600 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-BRANCHMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git branch:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC601 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-PRMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh pr:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC602 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-STASHMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git stash:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC603 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-RESTOREMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git restore:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC604 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-REBASEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git rebase:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC605 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-MERGEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git merge:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC606 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CHERRY-PICKMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git cherry-pick:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC607 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-APPLYMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git apply:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC608 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-AMMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git am:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC609 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CRONTABMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(crontab:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC610 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-SYSTEMCTL-ENABLEMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(systemctl enable:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC611 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-LAUNCHCTL-LOADMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(launchctl load:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC612 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-LAUNCHCTL-BOOTSTRAPMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(launchctl bootstrap:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC613 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CHMODMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(chmod:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC614 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CHOWNMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(chown:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC615 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CHGRPMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(chgrp:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC616 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-SUMCP configuration auto-approves Bash(su:*) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC617 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBFETCH-RAW-GITHUBMCP configuration auto-approves WebFetch(domain:raw.githubusercontent.com) through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC618 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-READMCP configuration auto-approves bare Read through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC619 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WRITEMCP configuration auto-approves bare Write through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC620 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-EDITMCP configuration auto-approves bare Edit through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC621 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GLOBMCP configuration auto-approves bare Glob through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC622 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GREPMCP configuration auto-approves bare Grep through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC623 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBFETCHMCP configuration auto-approves bare WebFetch through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC624 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBSEARCHMCP configuration auto-approves bare WebSearch through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC625 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-BASHMCP configuration auto-approves bare Bash through autoApprovepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC626 / CLAUDE-BASHClaude settings permissions allow bare Bash in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC627 / CLAUDE-READClaude settings permissions allow bare Read in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC628 / CLAUDE-WRITEClaude settings permissions allow bare Write in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC629 / CLAUDE-EDITClaude settings permissions allow bare Edit in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC630 / CLAUDE-GLOBClaude settings permissions allow bare Glob in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC631 / CLAUDE-GREPClaude settings permissions allow bare Grep in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC632 / CLAUDE-WEBFETCHClaude settings permissions allow bare WebFetch in a shared committed configpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlypreview, claude
SEC633Hook script attempts destructive root deletionpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC634Hook script accesses a sensitive system password filepreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC635Hook script writes to a shell profile startup filepreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC636Hook script writes to SSH authorized_keyspreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC637MCP configuration command attempts destructive root deletionpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC638MCP configuration command accesses a sensitive system password filepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC639MCP configuration command writes to a shell profile startup filepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC640MCP configuration command writes to SSH authorized_keyspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC641Claude settings command hook attempts destructive root deletionpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC642Claude settings command hook accesses a sensitive system password filepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC643Claude settings command hook writes to a shell profile startup filepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC644Claude settings command hook writes to SSH authorized_keyspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC645Plugin hook command attempts destructive root deletionpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC646Plugin hook command accesses a sensitive system password filepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC647Plugin hook command writes to a shell profile startup filepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC648Plugin hook command writes to SSH authorized_keyspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC649Hook script manipulates cron persistencepreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC650Hook script registers a systemd service or unit for persistencepreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC651Hook script registers a launchd plist for persistencepreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC652MCP configuration command manipulates cron persistencepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC653MCP configuration command registers a systemd service or unit for persistencepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC654MCP configuration command registers a launchd plist for persistencepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC655Claude settings command hook manipulates cron persistencepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC656Claude settings command hook registers a systemd service or unit for persistencepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC657Claude settings command hook registers a launchd plist for persistencepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC658Plugin hook command manipulates cron persistencepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC659Plugin hook command registers a systemd service or unit for persistencepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC660Plugin hook command registers a launchd plist for persistencepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC661Hook script performs an insecure permission changepreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC662Hook script manipulates setuid or setgid permissionspreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC663Hook script manipulates Linux capabilitiespreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC664MCP configuration command performs an insecure permission changepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC665MCP configuration command manipulates setuid or setgid permissionspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC666MCP configuration command manipulates Linux capabilitiespreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC667Claude settings command hook performs an insecure permission changepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC668Claude settings command hook manipulates setuid or setgid permissionspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC669Claude settings command hook manipulates Linux capabilitiespreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC670Plugin hook command performs an insecure permission changepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC671Plugin hook command manipulates setuid or setgid permissionspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC672Plugin hook command manipulates Linux capabilitiespreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC673Hook script posts secret material to a webhook endpointpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC674MCP configuration command appears to send secret material over the networkpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC675MCP configuration command sends secret material to an insecure http:// endpointpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC676MCP configuration command posts secret material to a webhook endpointpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC677Claude settings command hook appears to send secret material over the networkpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC678Claude settings command hook sends secret material to an insecure http:// endpointpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC679Claude settings command hook posts secret material to a webhook endpointpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC680Plugin hook command appears to send secret material over the networkpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC681Plugin hook command sends secret material to an insecure http:// endpointpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC682Plugin hook command posts secret material to a webhook endpointpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC683Hook script transfers a sensitive credential file to a remote destinationpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC684MCP configuration command transfers a sensitive credential file to a remote destinationpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC685Claude settings command hook transfers a sensitive credential file to a remote destinationpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC686Plugin hook command transfers a sensitive credential file to a remote destinationpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC687Hook script reads local clipboard contentspreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC688Hook script accesses browser credential or cookie storespreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC689MCP configuration command reads local clipboard contentspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC690MCP configuration command accesses browser credential or cookie storespreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC691Claude settings command hook reads local clipboard contentspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC692Claude settings command hook accesses browser credential or cookie storespreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC693Plugin hook command reads local clipboard contentspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC694Plugin hook command accesses browser credential or cookie storespreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC695Hook script exfiltrates clipboard contents over the networkpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC696Hook script exfiltrates browser credential or cookie store datapreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC697MCP configuration command exfiltrates clipboard contents over the networkpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC698MCP configuration command exfiltrates browser credential or cookie store datapreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC699Claude settings command hook exfiltrates clipboard contents over the networkpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC700Claude settings command hook exfiltrates browser credential or cookie store datapreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC701Plugin hook command exfiltrates clipboard contents over the networkpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC702Plugin hook command exfiltrates browser credential or cookie store datapreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC703Hook script captures a screenshot or desktop imagepreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC704Hook script captures and exfiltrates a screenshot or desktop imagepreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC705MCP configuration command captures a screenshot or desktop imagepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC706MCP configuration command captures and exfiltrates a screenshot or desktop imagepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC707Claude settings command hook captures a screenshot or desktop imagepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC708Claude settings command hook captures and exfiltrates a screenshot or desktop imagepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC709Plugin hook command captures a screenshot or desktop imagepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC710Plugin hook command captures and exfiltrates a screenshot or desktop imagepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC711Hook script captures a camera image or webcam streampreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC712Hook script records microphone or audio inputpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC713Hook script captures and exfiltrates camera or webcam datapreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC714Hook script records and exfiltrates microphone or audio inputpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC715MCP configuration command captures a webcam or camera imagepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC716MCP configuration command captures microphone audiopreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC717MCP configuration command captures and exfiltrates webcam or camera datapreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC718MCP configuration command captures and exfiltrates microphone audiopreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC719Claude settings command hook captures a webcam or camera imagepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC720Claude settings command hook captures microphone audiopreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC721Claude settings command hook captures and exfiltrates webcam or camera datapreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC722Claude settings command hook captures and exfiltrates microphone audiopreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC723Plugin hook command captures a webcam or camera imagepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC724Plugin hook command captures microphone audiopreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC725Plugin hook command captures and exfiltrates webcam or camera datapreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC726Plugin hook command captures and exfiltrates microphone audiopreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC727Hook script captures keystrokes or keyboard inputpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC728Hook script captures and exfiltrates keystrokes or keyboard inputpreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC729MCP configuration command captures keystrokes or keyboard inputpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC730MCP configuration command captures and exfiltrates keystrokes or keyboard inputpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC731Claude settings command hook captures keystrokes or keyboard inputpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC732Claude settings command hook captures and exfiltrates keystrokes or keyboard inputpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC733Plugin hook command captures keystrokes or keyboard inputpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC734Plugin hook command captures and exfiltrates keystrokes or keyboard inputpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC735Hook script dumps environment variables or shell statepreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC736Hook script dumps and exfiltrates environment variables or shell statepreviewStablestable_gatedDenyper_filehookstructuralmessage_onlybase
SEC737MCP configuration command dumps environment variables or shell statepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC738MCP configuration command dumps and exfiltrates environment variables or shell statepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC739Claude settings command hook dumps environment variables or shell statepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC740Claude settings command hook dumps and exfiltrates environment variables or shell statepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_fileclaude_settingsstructuralmessage_onlybase, claude
SEC741Plugin hook command dumps environment variables or shell statepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC742Plugin hook command dumps and exfiltrates environment variables or shell statepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlybase, mcp
SEC743package.json defines a dangerous install-time lifecycle scriptpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC744package.json installs a dependency from a git or forge shortcut sourcepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC745package.json uses an unbounded dependency version like * or latestpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC746Dockerfile RUN downloads remote code and executes itpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filedockerfilestructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC747Dockerfile final stage explicitly runs as rootpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filedockerfilestructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC748Docker Compose service enables privileged container runtime or host namespace accesspreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filedocker-composestructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC749Dockerfile FROM uses a mutable registry image without a digest pinpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filedockerfilestructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC750Docker Compose service image uses a mutable registry reference without a digest pinpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filedocker-composestructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC751Dockerfile FROM uses a latest or implicit-latest image tagpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filedockerfilestructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC752Docker Compose service image uses a latest or implicit-latest tagpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filedocker-composestructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC753package.json installs a dependency from a direct archive URL sourcepreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filejsonstructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC754Devcontainer config defines a host-side initializeCommandpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filedevcontainerstructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC755Devcontainer config bind-mounts sensitive local host materialpreviewStablestable_gatedWarnper_filedevcontainerstructuralmessage_onlysupply-chain
SEC756Installed npm dependency version matches an offline vulnerability advisorypreviewPreviewpreview_blockedWarnworkspaceworkspacestructuralsuggestionadvisory

Builtin preset activation model

All shipped rules now participate in the preset model through a deterministic surface-and-tier mapping:

  • recommended: the quiet practical default for most teams, composed from curated high-signal shipped rules
  • base: the minimal stable baseline kept for explicit compatibility-focused setups
  • preview: deeper-review rules that expand coverage beyond the recommended default and include context-sensitive shipped preview checks
  • compat: workspace policy mismatch rules (SEC401-SEC403) kept as a separate policy lane
  • skills: markdown-surface rules for the core instruction/skills lane
  • mcp: all json, tool_json, and server_json surface rules, including preview MCP/config rules
  • claude: all claude_settings surface rules
  • guidance: advice-oriented guidance checks such as Copilot instruction layout and length guidance
  • governance: opt-in review rules for shared mutation authority and broad bare tool grants that should stay separate from the main security lane
  • supply-chain: sidecar supply-chain hardening checks such as GitHub Actions workflow rules
  • advisory: offline dependency vulnerability checks driven by installed lockfile versions and the active advisory snapshot

Important behavior:

  • strict is a severity overlay, not a membership preset: when enabled, active security rules are raised through preset policy instead of silently activating new rules by itself.
  • if [presets] is omitted, lintai enables recommended by default.
  • Dedicated sidecar lanes such as compat, guidance, governance, supply-chain, and advisory stay opt-in and are not implied by base or preview.
  • Category overrides do not activate rules outside the resolved preset set.
  • Explicit [rules] SECxxx = "..." remains the escape hatch for intentional per-rule opt-in outside the default preset set.

Provider: lintai-ai-security

SEC101 / MD-HIDDEN-INSTRUCTIONS — Hidden HTML comment contains dangerous agent instructions

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-HIDDEN-INSTRUCTIONS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: heuristic
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: safe_fix
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Depends on suspicious phrase heuristics inside hidden HTML comments.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, a non-heuristic graduation basis, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Heuristic preview rule; not a stable contract and may evolve as false-positive tuning improves.

SEC102 / MD-DOWNLOAD-EXEC — Markdown contains remote download-and-execute instruction outside code blocks

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-DOWNLOAD-EXEC
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: heuristic
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: suggestion
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Depends on prose command heuristics outside code blocks.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, a non-heuristic graduation basis, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Heuristic preview rule; not a stable contract and may evolve as false-positive tuning improves.

SEC103 / MD-HIDDEN-DOWNLOAD-EXEC — Hidden HTML comment contains remote download-and-execute instruction

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-HIDDEN-DOWNLOAD-EXEC
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: heuristic
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: safe_fix
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Depends on hidden-comment command heuristics rather than a structural execution model.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, a non-heuristic graduation basis, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Heuristic preview rule; not a stable contract and may evolve as false-positive tuning improves.

SEC104 / MD-BASE64-EXEC — Markdown contains a base64-decoded executable payload outside code blocks

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-BASE64-EXEC
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: heuristic
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Depends on prose base64-and-exec text heuristics.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, a non-heuristic graduation basis, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Heuristic preview rule; not a stable contract and may evolve as false-positive tuning improves.

SEC105 / MD-PATH-TRAVERSAL — Markdown instructions reference parent-directory traversal for file access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PATH-TRAVERSAL
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: heuristic
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Depends on prose path-traversal and access-verb heuristics.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, a non-heuristic graduation basis, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Heuristic preview rule; not a stable contract and may evolve as false-positive tuning improves.

SEC201 / HOOK-DOWNLOAD-EXEC — Hook script downloads remote code and executes it

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: HOOK-DOWNLOAD-EXEC
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: suggestion
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit remote download-and-execute behavior in hook shell lines, not prose text.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals download-and-execute observation over non-comment hook lines.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-download-exec
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC202 / HOOK-SECRET-EXFIL — Hook script appears to exfiltrate secrets through a network call

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: HOOK-SECRET-EXFIL
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: suggestion
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches secret-bearing network exfil behavior in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals secret exfil observation from network markers plus secret markers on non-comment lines.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-secret-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC203 / HOOK-PLAIN-HTTP-SECRET-EXFIL — Hook script sends secret material to an insecure http:// endpoint

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: HOOK-PLAIN-HTTP-SECRET-EXFIL
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: suggestion
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches insecure HTTP transport on a secret-bearing hook exfil path.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals precise http:// span observation gated by concurrent secret exfil markers.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-plain-http-secret-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC204 / HOOK-TLS-BYPASS — Hook script disables TLS or certificate verification for a network call

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: HOOK-TLS-BYPASS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit TLS verification bypass tokens in executable hook network context.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals TLS-bypass token observation over parsed hook line tokens and network context.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-tls-bypass
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-tls-verified-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC205 / HOOK-STATIC-AUTH — Hook script embeds static authentication material in a network call

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: HOOK-STATIC-AUTH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches literal static auth material in hook URLs or authorization headers.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals userinfo/header literal extraction excluding dynamic references.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-static-auth-userinfo
  • Benign Corpus: hook-auth-dynamic-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC206 / HOOK-BASE64-EXEC — Hook script decodes a base64 payload and executes it

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: HOOK-BASE64-EXEC
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: suggestion
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit base64 decode-and-execute behavior in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals base64-decode plus exec observation over non-comment hook lines.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-base64-exec
  • Benign Corpus: hook-base64-decode-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC301 / MCP-SHELL-WRAPPER — MCP configuration shells out through sh -c or bash -c

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-SHELL-WRAPPER
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit shell-wrapper command structure in JSON config, whether the shell is the command itself or the first launch argument.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command and args structure observation for sh -c or bash -c wrappers, either through command or args[0].
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-shell-wrapper, mcp-shell-wrapper-args0
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic, mcp-shell-wrapper-args-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC302 / MCP-PLAIN-HTTP-ENDPOINT — Configuration contains an insecure http:// endpoint

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-PLAIN-HTTP-ENDPOINT
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: suggestion
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit insecure http:// endpoints in configuration values.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals precise http:// endpoint span resolution from parsed JSON location map.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-plain-http
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-trusted-endpoint-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC303 / MCP-CREDENTIAL-ENV-PASSTHROUGH — MCP configuration passes through credential environment variables

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-CREDENTIAL-ENV-PASSTHROUGH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit credential env passthrough by key inside configuration env maps.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals env-map key observation for credential passthrough keys.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-credential-env-passthrough
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC304 / MCP-TLS-BYPASS — Configuration disables TLS or certificate verification

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-TLS-BYPASS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit TLS or certificate verification disable flags in configuration.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals boolean and key observation for trust-verification disable settings.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-trust-verification-disabled
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-trust-verified-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC305 / MCP-STATIC-AUTH — Configuration embeds static authentication material in a connection or auth value

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-STATIC-AUTH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches literal static auth material embedded directly in configuration values.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals literal authorization or userinfo span extraction excluding dynamic placeholders.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-static-authorization
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-authorization-placeholder-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC306 / MCP-HIDDEN-INSTRUCTIONS — JSON configuration description contains override-style hidden instructions

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-HIDDEN-INSTRUCTIONS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: heuristic
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Depends on descriptive-field phrase heuristics in JSON text.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, a non-heuristic graduation basis, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Heuristic preview rule; not a stable contract and may evolve as false-positive tuning improves.

SEC307 / MCP-SENSITIVE-ENV-REFERENCE — Configuration forwards sensitive environment variable references

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-SENSITIVE-ENV-REFERENCE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: heuristic
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Depends on sensitive env-name heuristics in forwarded references.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, a non-heuristic graduation basis, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Heuristic preview rule; not a stable contract and may evolve as false-positive tuning improves.

SEC308 / MCP-SUSPICIOUS-ENDPOINT — Configuration points at a suspicious remote endpoint

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-SUSPICIOUS-ENDPOINT
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: heuristic
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Depends on suspicious host-marker heuristics for remote endpoints.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, a non-heuristic graduation basis, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Heuristic preview rule; not a stable contract and may evolve as false-positive tuning improves.

SEC309 / MCP-LITERAL-SECRET — Configuration commits literal secret material in env, auth, or header values

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-LITERAL-SECRET
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches literal secret material committed into env, header, or auth-like JSON fields.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals literal secret observation over env, header, and auth-like keys excluding dynamic placeholders.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-literal-secret-config
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-secret-placeholder-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC310 / MCP-METADATA-HOST-LITERAL — Configuration endpoint targets a metadata or private-network host literal

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-METADATA-HOST-LITERAL
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit metadata-service or private-network host literals in endpoint-like configuration values.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals endpoint-host extraction over URL-like endpoint fields with metadata/private-host classification.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-metadata-host-literal
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-public-endpoint-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC311 / PLUGIN-UNSAFE-PATH — Cursor plugin manifest contains an unsafe absolute or parent-traversing path

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: PLUGIN-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches absolute or parent-traversing paths in committed Cursor plugin manifest path fields.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals plugin-manifest path observation limited to known plugin path fields.
  • Malicious Corpus: cursor-plugin-unsafe-path
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-safe-paths
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC312 / MD-PRIVATE-KEY — Markdown contains committed private key material

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PRIVATE-KEY
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit committed private-key PEM markers inside agent markdown surfaces.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals private-key marker observation across parsed markdown regions excluding placeholder examples.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-private-key-pem
  • Benign Corpus: skill-public-key-pem-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC313 / MD-PIPE-SHELL — Fenced shell example pipes remote content directly into a shell

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PIPE-SHELL
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Depends on fenced shell-example command heuristics and still needs broader external precision review.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC314 / TOOL-MISSING-MACHINE-FIELDS — MCP-style tool descriptor is missing required machine fields

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: TOOL-MISSING-MACHINE-FIELDS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: tool_json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks unambiguous MCP-style tool descriptors for missing machine fields instead of relying on prose heuristics.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ToolJsonSignals MCP collection analysis over parsed tool descriptor JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: tool-json-mcp-missing-machine-fields
  • Benign Corpus: tool-json-mcp-valid-tool
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC315 / TOOL-DUPLICATE-NAMES — MCP-style tool descriptor collection contains duplicate tool names

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: TOOL-DUPLICATE-NAMES
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: tool_json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks structured MCP-style tool collections for duplicate names that can shadow one another.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ToolJsonSignals duplicate-name detection over MCP-style tool collections.
  • Malicious Corpus: tool-json-duplicate-tool-names
  • Benign Corpus: tool-json-unique-tool-names
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC316 / OPENAI-STRICT-ADDITIONAL-PROPERTIES — OpenAI strict tool schema omits recursive additionalProperties: false

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: OPENAI-STRICT-ADDITIONAL-PROPERTIES
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: tool_json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks OpenAI strict tool schemas for recursive object locking with additionalProperties: false.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ToolJsonSignals recursive schema walk over OpenAI function.parameters when strict mode is enabled.
  • Malicious Corpus: tool-json-openai-strict-additional-properties
  • Benign Corpus: tool-json-openai-strict-locked
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC317 / OPENAI-STRICT-REQUIRED-COVERAGE — OpenAI strict tool schema does not require every declared property

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: OPENAI-STRICT-REQUIRED-COVERAGE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: tool_json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks OpenAI strict tool schemas for full required coverage of declared properties.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ToolJsonSignals recursive required-versus-properties comparison over strict OpenAI schemas.
  • Malicious Corpus: tool-json-openai-strict-required-coverage
  • Benign Corpus: tool-json-openai-strict-required-complete
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC318 / ANTHROPIC-STRICT-ADDITIONAL-PROPERTIES — Anthropic strict tool input schema omits additionalProperties: false

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: ANTHROPIC-STRICT-ADDITIONAL-PROPERTIES
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: tool_json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks Anthropic strict tool input_schema objects for explicit additionalProperties: false.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ToolJsonSignals recursive schema walk over Anthropic input_schema when strict mode is enabled.
  • Malicious Corpus: tool-json-anthropic-strict-open-schema
  • Benign Corpus: tool-json-anthropic-strict-locked
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC319 / SERVER-REMOTE-URL — server.json remotes entry uses an insecure or non-public remote URL

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: SERVER-REMOTE-URL
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: server_json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks MCP registry remotes[] URLs for insecure HTTP and non-public host literals without inspecting local package transport URLs.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ServerJsonSignals remotes[] URL analysis limited to streamable-http and sse entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: server-json-insecure-remote-url
  • Benign Corpus: server-json-loopback-package-transport-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC320 / SERVER-UNDEFINED-URL-VAR — server.json remotes URL references an undefined template variable

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: SERVER-UNDEFINED-URL-VAR
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: server_json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks server.json remotes[] URL templates against variables defined on the same remote entry.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ServerJsonSignals placeholder extraction over remotes[] URLs compared with remotes[].variables keys.
  • Malicious Corpus: server-json-unresolved-remote-variable
  • Benign Corpus: server-json-remote-variable-defined
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC321 / SERVER-LITERAL-AUTH-HEADER — server.json remotes header commits literal authentication material

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: SERVER-LITERAL-AUTH-HEADER
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: server_json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks remotes[].headers[] auth-like values for literal bearer/basic material or literal API key style values.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ServerJsonSignals inspects remotes[].headers[] auth-like names and value literals without looking at packages[].transport.
  • Malicious Corpus: server-json-literal-auth-header
  • Benign Corpus: server-json-auth-header-placeholder-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC322 / SERVER-UNDEFINED-HEADER-VAR — server.json remotes header value references an undefined template variable

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: SERVER-UNDEFINED-HEADER-VAR
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: server_json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks auth-like remotes[].headers[].value placeholders against variables defined on the same header object.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ServerJsonSignals placeholder extraction over remotes[].headers[].value compared with headers[].variables keys.
  • Malicious Corpus: server-json-unresolved-header-variable
  • Benign Corpus: server-json-header-variable-defined
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC323 / SERVER-AUTH-SECRET-FLAG — server.json auth header carries material without an explicit secret flag

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: SERVER-AUTH-SECRET-FLAG
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: server_json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Secret policy expectations can vary across registry producers, so the first release keeps this as a context-sensitive preview review signal.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC324 / GHA-UNPINNED-ACTION — GitHub Actions workflow uses a third-party action that is not pinned to a full commit SHA

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: GHA-UNPINNED-ACTION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: github_workflow
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: recommended
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: recommended, supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks workflow uses: entries for third-party actions that rely on mutable refs instead of immutable commit SHAs; positioned as a supply-chain hardening control rather than a direct exploit claim.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: GithubWorkflowSignals line-level uses: extraction gated by semantically confirmed workflow YAML.
  • Malicious Corpus: github-workflow-third-party-unpinned-action
  • Benign Corpus: github-workflow-pinned-third-party-action
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule positioned as a supply-chain hardening control: high-precision and actionable, but not a blanket claim of direct repository compromise.

SEC325 / GHA-UNTRUSTED-RUN-INTERPOLATION — GitHub Actions workflow interpolates untrusted expression data directly inside a run command

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: GHA-UNTRUSTED-RUN-INTERPOLATION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: github_workflow
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Shell safety depends on how the interpolated expression is consumed inside the run command.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC326 / GHA-PR-TARGET-HEAD-CHECKOUT — GitHub Actions pull_request_target workflow checks out untrusted pull request head content

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: GHA-PR-TARGET-HEAD-CHECKOUT
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: github_workflow
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks pull_request_target workflows for actions/checkout steps that explicitly pull untrusted pull request head refs instead of the safer default merge context.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: GithubWorkflowSignals event gating plus line-level checkout ref extraction for pull_request_target workflows.
  • Malicious Corpus: github-workflow-pull-request-target-head-checkout
  • Benign Corpus: github-workflow-pull-request-target-safe-checkout
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC327 / GHA-WRITE-ALL-PERMISSIONS — GitHub Actions workflow grants GITHUB_TOKEN write-all permissions

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: GHA-WRITE-ALL-PERMISSIONS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: github_workflow
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks workflow permissions for the explicit write-all shortcut, which exceeds least-privilege guidance for GITHUB_TOKEN.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: GithubWorkflowSignals line-level permissions extraction for semantically confirmed workflow YAML.
  • Malicious Corpus: github-workflow-write-all-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: github-workflow-read-only-permissions
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC328 / GHA-WRITE-CAPABLE-THIRD-PARTY-ACTION — GitHub Actions workflow combines explicit write-capable permissions with a third-party action

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: GHA-WRITE-CAPABLE-THIRD-PARTY-ACTION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: github_workflow
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: recommended
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: recommended, supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Write-capable token scopes and third-party action usage are compositional and need more corpus-backed precision review before a stable launch.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC329 / MCP-MUTABLE-LAUNCHER — MCP configuration launches tooling through a mutable package runner

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-MUTABLE-LAUNCHER
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: recommended
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: recommended, base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP config command launchers for mutable package-runner forms such as npx, uvx, pnpm dlx, yarn dlx, and pipx run.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command/args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig objects with launcher-specific argument gating.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-mutable-launcher
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-pinned-launcher-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC330 / MCP-DOWNLOAD-EXEC — MCP configuration command downloads remote content and pipes it into a shell

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-DOWNLOAD-EXEC
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP config command and args values for explicit curl|shell or wget|shell execution chains.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command/args string analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig objects, limited to explicit download-pipe-shell patterns.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-inline-download-exec
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC331 / MCP-TLS-BYPASS — MCP configuration command disables TLS verification in a network-capable execution path

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-TLS-BYPASS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP config command and args values for explicit TLS-bypass tokens in a network-capable execution context.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command/args string analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig objects gated by network markers plus TLS-bypass tokens.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-tls-bypass
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-network-tls-verified-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC335 / MD-METADATA-SERVICE-ACCESS — AI-native markdown contains a direct cloud metadata-service access example

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-METADATA-SERVICE-ACCESS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Metadata-service examples can appear in legitimate security training content, so the first release stays context-sensitive preview rather than claiming universal exploit signal.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC336 / MCP-BROAD-ENVFILE — Repo-local MCP client config loads a broad dotenv-style envFile

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-BROAD-ENVFILE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Broad envFile loading is useful review signal, but whether it is materially risky still depends on repo-local review policy and env contents.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC337 / MCP-DOCKER-UNPINNED-IMAGE — MCP configuration launches Docker with an image reference that is not digest-pinned

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-DOCKER-UNPINNED-IMAGE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP config Docker launch paths for image references that are not pinned by digest, including tag-only refs such as :latest or :1.2.3.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals docker run argument analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig objects, limited to command == docker plus args beginning with run.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-docker-unpinned-image
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-docker-digest-pinned-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC338 / MCP-DOCKER-SENSITIVE-MOUNT — MCP configuration launches Docker with a bind mount of sensitive host material

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-DOCKER-SENSITIVE-MOUNT
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP config Docker launch paths for bind mounts of sensitive host sources such as docker.sock, SSH material, cloud credentials, and kubeconfig directories.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals docker run argument analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig objects, limited to -v/--volume and --mount bind forms with sensitive host-path markers.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-docker-sensitive-mount
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-docker-named-volume-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC339 / MCP-DOCKER-HOST-ESCAPE — MCP configuration launches Docker with a host-escape or privileged runtime flag

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-DOCKER-HOST-ESCAPE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP config Docker launch paths for privileged or host-escape runtime flags such as --privileged, --network host, --pid host, and --ipc host.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals docker run argument analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig objects, limited to explicit privileged and host namespace flags.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-docker-host-escape
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-docker-safe-run
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC340 / CLAUDE-HOOK-MUTABLE-LAUNCHER — Claude settings command hook uses a mutable package launcher

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-HOOK-MUTABLE-LAUNCHER
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: recommended
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: recommended, base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for mutable package launcher forms such as npx, uvx, pnpm dlx, yarn dlx, and pipx run.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook analysis over committed .claude/settings.json or claude/settings.json objects with type == command under hooks.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-mutable-launcher
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-pinned-launcher-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC341 / CLAUDE-HOOK-DOWNLOAD-EXEC — Claude settings command hook downloads remote content and pipes it into a shell

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-HOOK-DOWNLOAD-EXEC
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit curl|shell or wget|shell execution chains.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command, limited to explicit download-pipe-shell patterns.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-inline-download-exec
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC342 / CLAUDE-HOOK-TLS-BYPASS — Claude settings command hook disables TLS verification in a network-capable execution path

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-HOOK-TLS-BYPASS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit TLS-bypass tokens in a network-capable execution context.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command, gated by network markers plus TLS-bypass tokens.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-command-tls-bypass
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-tls-verified-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC343 / PLUGIN-HOOK-MUTABLE-LAUNCHER — Plugin hook command uses a mutable package launcher

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: PLUGIN-HOOK-MUTABLE-LAUNCHER
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for mutable package launchers such as npx, uvx, pnpm dlx, yarn dlx, and pipx run.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks objects limited to actual hook command values.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-mutable-launcher
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC344 / PLUGIN-HOOK-DOWNLOAD-EXEC — Plugin hook command downloads remote content and pipes it into a shell

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: PLUGIN-HOOK-DOWNLOAD-EXEC
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit curl|shell or wget|shell execution chains.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks objects, limited to explicit download-pipe-shell patterns.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-inline-download-exec
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC345 / PLUGIN-HOOK-TLS-BYPASS — Plugin hook command disables TLS verification in a network-capable execution path

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: PLUGIN-HOOK-TLS-BYPASS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit TLS-bypass tokens in a network-capable execution context.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks objects gated by network markers plus TLS-bypass tokens.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-tls-bypass
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC346 / MCP-DOCKER-PULL-ALWAYS — MCP configuration forces Docker to refresh from a mutable registry source

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-DOCKER-PULL-ALWAYS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP config Docker launch paths for explicit --pull always refresh policies that force a mutable registry fetch at runtime.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals docker run argument analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig objects, limited to explicit --pull=always or --pull always forms.
  • Malicious Corpus: gemini-mcp-docker-pull-always
  • Benign Corpus: gemini-mcp-docker-digest-pinned-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC347 / MD-MCP-MUTABLE-LAUNCHER — AI-native markdown example launches MCP through a mutable package runner

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-MCP-MUTABLE-LAUNCHER
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: recommended
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: recommended, preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Mutable MCP launcher examples in markdown can be legitimate setup guidance, so the first release stays in the core preview lane while broader field validation continues.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC348 / MD-DOCKER-MUTABLE-IMAGE — AI-native markdown Docker example uses a mutable registry image

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-DOCKER-MUTABLE-IMAGE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Mutable Docker image examples in markdown can be legitimate setup guidance, so the first release stays context-sensitive preview rather than a stronger default posture.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC349 / MD-DOCKER-HOST-ESCAPE — AI-native markdown Docker example uses a host-escape or privileged runtime pattern

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-DOCKER-HOST-ESCAPE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Docker host-escape examples in markdown can be legitimate ops guidance, so the first release stays context-sensitive preview while domain-specific precision is measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC350 / MD-UNTRUSTED-INSTRUCTION-PROMOTION — Instruction markdown promotes untrusted external content to developer/system-level instructions

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-UNTRUSTED-INSTRUCTION-PROMOTION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: heuristic
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Instruction-boundary promotion in markdown is prose-aware and needs external usefulness review before any stronger posture.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, a non-heuristic graduation basis, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Heuristic preview rule; not a stable contract and may evolve as false-positive tuning improves.

SEC351 / MD-APPROVAL-BYPASS — AI-native instruction explicitly disables user approval or confirmation

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-APPROVAL-BYPASS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: heuristic
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Approval-bypass guidance in markdown is prose-aware and needs external usefulness review before any stronger posture.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, a non-heuristic graduation basis, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Heuristic preview rule; not a stable contract and may evolve as false-positive tuning improves.

SEC352 / MD-UNSCOPED-BASH — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants unscoped Bash tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-UNSCOPED-BASH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: recommended
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: recommended, preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for exact bare Bash grants that expose unconstrained shell authority as shared default policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for bare Bash inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-unscoped-bash-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-scoped-bash-allowed-tools-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC353 / COPILOT-4K — GitHub Copilot instruction markdown exceeds the 4000-character guidance limit

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: COPILOT-4K
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: guidance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Long Copilot instruction files can still be intentional, so the first release stays guidance-only while usefulness is measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC354 / COPILOT-PATH-APPLYTO — Path-specific GitHub Copilot instruction markdown is missing applyTo frontmatter

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: COPILOT-PATH-APPLYTO
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: guidance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Missing applyTo on path-specific Copilot instruction files is deterministic, but the first release stays guidance-only while external usefulness is measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC355 / MD-WILDCARD-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants wildcard tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-WILDCARD-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Wildcard tool grants in AI-native frontmatter can still appear in convenience-oriented docs, so the first release stays least-privilege guidance-only.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC356 / PLUGIN-AGENT-PERMISSIONMODE — Plugin agent frontmatter sets permissionMode

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: PLUGIN-AGENT-PERMISSIONMODE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Plugin agent frontmatter can still include unsupported permission policy experiments, so the first release stays spec-guidance-only.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC357 / PLUGIN-AGENT-HOOKS — Plugin agent frontmatter sets hooks

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: PLUGIN-AGENT-HOOKS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Plugin agent frontmatter can still include unsupported hook experiments, so the first release stays spec-guidance-only.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC358 / PLUGIN-AGENT-MCPSERVERS — Plugin agent frontmatter sets mcpServers

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: PLUGIN-AGENT-MCPSERVERS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Plugin agent frontmatter can still include unsupported MCP server experiments, so the first release stays spec-guidance-only.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC359 / CURSOR-RULE-ALWAYSAPPLY — Cursor rule frontmatter alwaysApply must be boolean

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CURSOR-RULE-ALWAYSAPPLY
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Cursor rule frontmatter shape mismatches are deterministic, but the first release stays guidance-only while ecosystem usefulness is measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC360 / CURSOR-RULE-GLOBS — Cursor rule frontmatter globs must be a sequence of patterns

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CURSOR-RULE-GLOBS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Cursor rule path-matching shape mismatches are deterministic, but the first release stays guidance-only while ecosystem usefulness is measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC361 / CLAUDE-SETTINGS-SCHEMA — Claude settings file is missing a top-level $schema reference

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-SETTINGS-SCHEMA
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for omission of a top-level $schema reference.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact top-level $schema presence detection in parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-missing-schema
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-schema-present-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC362 / CLAUDE-BASH-WILDCARD — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-BASH-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for explicit wildcard Bash(*) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-bash-wildcard
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-bash-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC363 / CLAUDE-HOME-HOOK-PATH — Claude settings hook command uses a home-directory path in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-HOME-HOOK-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for hook commands rooted in the home directory.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact command-path analysis for home-directory rooted hook commands in parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-home-directory-hook-path
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-home-directory-safe-project-scoped
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC364 / CLAUDE-BYPASS-PERMISSIONS — Claude settings set permissions.defaultMode to bypassPermissions in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-BYPASS-PERMISSIONS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for explicit permissions.defaultMode = bypassPermissions.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for permissions.defaultMode = bypassPermissions on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-bypass-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-bypass-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC365 / CLAUDE-HTTP-HOOK-URL — Claude settings allow non-HTTPS HTTP hook URLs in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-HTTP-HOOK-URL
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for non-HTTPS allowedHttpHookUrls entries.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact URL-scheme analysis over allowedHttpHookUrls entries in parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-http-hook-url
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-http-hook-loopback-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC366 / CLAUDE-HTTP-HOOK-HOST — Claude settings allow dangerous host literals in allowedHttpHookUrls

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-HTTP-HOOK-HOST
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for dangerous host literals in allowedHttpHookUrls.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact host analysis over allowedHttpHookUrls entries in parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-dangerous-http-hook-host
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-http-hook-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC367 / CLAUDE-WEBFETCH-WILDCARD — Claude settings permissions allow WebFetch(*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-WEBFETCH-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for explicit wildcard WebFetch(*) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for WebFetch(*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-webfetch-wildcard
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-webfetch-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC368 / CLAUDE-ABS-HOOK-PATH — Claude settings hook command uses a repo-external absolute path in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-ABS-HOOK-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for repo-external absolute hook command paths.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact command-path analysis for repo-external absolute hook commands in parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-repo-external-absolute-hook-path
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-repo-external-absolute-hook-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC369 / CLAUDE-WRITE-WILDCARD — Claude settings permissions allow Write(*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-WRITE-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for explicit wildcard Write(*) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Write(*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-write-wildcard
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-write-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC370 / COPILOT-PATH-SUFFIX — Path-specific GitHub Copilot instruction markdown under .github/instructions/ uses the wrong file suffix

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: COPILOT-PATH-SUFFIX
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: guidance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Wrong suffix on path-specific Copilot instruction files is deterministic, but the first release stays guidance-only while ecosystem usefulness is measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC371 / COPILOT-APPLYTO-TYPE — Path-specific GitHub Copilot instruction markdown has an invalid applyTo shape

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: COPILOT-APPLYTO-TYPE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: guidance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Invalid applyTo shape on path-specific Copilot instruction files is deterministic, but the first release stays guidance-only while ecosystem usefulness is measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC372 / CLAUDE-READ-WILDCARD — Claude settings permissions allow Read(*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-READ-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for explicit wildcard Read(*) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Read(*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-read-wildcard
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-read-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC373 / CLAUDE-EDIT-WILDCARD — Claude settings permissions allow Edit(*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-EDIT-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for explicit wildcard Edit(*) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Edit(*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-edit-wildcard
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-edit-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC374 / CLAUDE-WEBSEARCH-WILDCARD — Claude settings permissions allow WebSearch(*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-WEBSEARCH-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for explicit wildcard WebSearch(*) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for WebSearch(*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-websearch-wildcard
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-websearch-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC375 / CLAUDE-GLOB-WILDCARD — Claude settings permissions allow Glob(*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GLOB-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for explicit wildcard Glob(*) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Glob(*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-glob-wildcard
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-glob-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC376 / CLAUDE-GREP-WILDCARD — Claude settings permissions allow Grep(*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GREP-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for explicit wildcard Grep(*) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Grep(*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-grep-wildcard
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-grep-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC377 / COPILOT-APPLYTO-GLOB — Path-specific GitHub Copilot instruction markdown has an invalid applyTo glob pattern

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: COPILOT-APPLYTO-GLOB
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: guidance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Invalid applyTo glob patterns on path-specific Copilot instruction files are deterministic, but the first release stays guidance-only while ecosystem usefulness is measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC378 / CURSOR-ALWAYSAPPLY-GLOBS — Cursor rule frontmatter should not set globs when alwaysApply is true

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CURSOR-ALWAYSAPPLY-GLOBS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Redundant globs alongside alwaysApply: true is deterministic, but the first release stays guidance-only while ecosystem usefulness is measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC379 / CURSOR-UNKNOWN-FRONTMATTER — Cursor rule frontmatter contains an unknown key

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CURSOR-UNKNOWN-FRONTMATTER
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Unknown Cursor rule frontmatter keys are deterministic, but the first release stays guidance-only while ecosystem usefulness is measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC380 / CURSOR-DESCRIPTION — Cursor rule frontmatter should include description

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CURSOR-DESCRIPTION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Missing description on Cursor rules is deterministic, but the first release stays guidance-only while ecosystem usefulness is measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC381 / CLAUDE-HOOK-TIMEOUT — Claude settings command hook should set timeout in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-HOOK-TIMEOUT
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact omission of timeout on command hooks.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact command-hook timeout presence detection in parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-missing-hook-timeout
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-hook-timeout-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC382 / CLAUDE-HOOK-MATCHER-EVENT — Claude settings should not use matcher on unsupported hook events

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-HOOK-MATCHER-EVENT
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact use of matcher on unsupported hook events.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact hook-event and matcher presence detection in parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-matcher-on-stop-event
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-matcher-pretooluse-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC383 / CLAUDE-HOOK-MISSING-MATCHER — Claude settings should set matcher on matcher-capable hook events

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-HOOK-MISSING-MATCHER
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact omission of matcher on matcher-capable hook events.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact hook-event and matcher absence detection in parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-missing-required-matcher
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-required-matcher-present-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC384 / CLAUDE-WEBSEARCH-UNSCOPED — Claude settings permissions allow bare WebSearch in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-WEBSEARCH-UNSCOPED
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for bare WebSearch grants without a reviewed scope.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for bare WebSearch inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-websearch
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-websearch-scoped-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC385 / CLAUDE-GIT-PUSH-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git push) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-PUSH-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git push) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git push) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-git-push-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-git-push-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC386 / CLAUDE-GIT-CHECKOUT-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git checkout:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-CHECKOUT-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git checkout:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git checkout:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-git-checkout-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-git-checkout-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC387 / CLAUDE-GIT-COMMIT-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git commit:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-COMMIT-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git commit:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git commit:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-git-commit-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-git-commit-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC388 / CLAUDE-GIT-STASH-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git stash:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-STASH-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git stash:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git stash:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-git-stash-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-git-stash-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC389 / MD-WEBSEARCH-UNSCOPED — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare WebSearch tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-WEBSEARCH-UNSCOPED
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for bare WebSearch grants that omit a reviewed search scope.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for bare WebSearch inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-risky-frontmatter-tool-grants
  • Benign Corpus: skill-reviewed-frontmatter-tool-grants-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC390 / MD-GIT-PUSH-PERMISSION — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git push) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-PUSH-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Shared git push grants in AI-native frontmatter can be legitimate workflow policy, so the first release stays in the opt-in governance lane while usefulness and default posture are measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC391 / MD-GIT-CHECKOUT-PERMISSION — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git checkout:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-CHECKOUT-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Shared git checkout grants in AI-native frontmatter can be legitimate workflow policy, so the first release stays in the opt-in governance lane while usefulness and default posture are measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC392 / MD-GIT-COMMIT-PERMISSION — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git commit:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-COMMIT-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Shared git commit grants in AI-native frontmatter can be legitimate workflow policy, so the first release stays in the opt-in governance lane while usefulness and default posture are measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC393 / MD-GIT-STASH-PERMISSION — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git stash:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-STASH-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Shared git stash grants in AI-native frontmatter can be legitimate workflow policy, so the first release stays in the opt-in governance lane while usefulness and default posture are measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, external usefulness evidence, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC394 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WILDCARD — MCP configuration auto-approves all tools with autoApprove: ["*"]

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit wildcard auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["*"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC395 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-TOOLS — MCP configuration auto-approves all tools with autoApproveTools: true

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit blanket auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact boolean detection for autoApproveTools: true on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-tools-true
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-tools-false-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC396 / MCP-TRUST-TOOLS — MCP configuration fully trusts tools with trustTools: true

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-TRUST-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit blanket tool trust in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact boolean detection for trustTools: true on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-trust-tools-true
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-trust-tools-false-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC397 / MCP-SANDBOX-DISABLED — MCP configuration disables sandboxing with sandbox: false or disableSandbox: true

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-SANDBOX-DISABLED
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit MCP config booleans that disable sandbox isolation.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact boolean detection for sandbox: false or disableSandbox: true on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-sandbox-disabled
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-sandbox-enabled-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC398 / MCP-CAPABILITIES-WILDCARD — MCP configuration grants all capabilities with capabilities: ["*"] or capabilities: "*"

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-CAPABILITIES-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit wildcard capability grants in MCP config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact wildcard detection for capabilities scalar or array values on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-capabilities-wildcard
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-capabilities-scoped-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC399 / CLAUDE-NPX-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(npx ...) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-NPX-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(npx ...) mutable package-runner authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(npx ...) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-npx-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-npx-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC400 / CLAUDE-ENABLED-MCPJSON-SERVERS — Claude settings enable enabledMcpjsonServers in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-ENABLED-MCPJSON-SERVERS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact enabledMcpjsonServers enablement.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact non-empty enabledMcpjsonServers detection in parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-enabled-mcpjson-servers
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-empty-enabled-mcpjson-servers-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC404 / MD-WEBFETCH-UNSCOPED — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare WebFetch tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-WEBFETCH-UNSCOPED
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for exact bare WebFetch grants that expose unconstrained remote fetch authority as shared default policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for bare WebFetch inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-unscoped-webfetch-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-scoped-webfetch-allowed-tools-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC405 / CLAUDE-PACKAGE-INSTALL-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow package installation commands in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-PACKAGE-INSTALL-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for broad package installation authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string-family detection for package installation permissions such as Bash(pip install) or Bash(npm install) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-package-install-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-bash-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC406 / CLAUDE-GIT-ADD-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git add:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-ADD-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git add:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git add:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-git-add-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-git-add-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC407 / CLAUDE-GIT-CLONE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git clone:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-CLONE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git clone:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git clone:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-git-clone-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-git-clone-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC408 / CLAUDE-GH-PR-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh pr:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-PR-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(gh pr:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(gh pr:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-pr-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-pr-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC409 / CLAUDE-GIT-FETCH-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git fetch:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-FETCH-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git fetch:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git fetch:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-git-fetch-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-git-fetch-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC410 / CLAUDE-GIT-LS-REMOTE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git ls-remote:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-LS-REMOTE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for wildcard remote repository inspection grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(git ls-remote:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-git-ls-remote-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-git-ls-remote-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC411 / CLAUDE-CURL-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(curl:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-CURL-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for explicit wildcard curl execution grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(curl:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-curl-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-curl-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC412 / CLAUDE-WGET-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(wget:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-WGET-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for explicit wildcard wget execution grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(wget:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-wget-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-wget-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC413 / CLAUDE-GIT-CONFIG-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git config:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-CONFIG-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for wildcard git config mutation grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(git config:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-git-config-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-git-config-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC414 / CLAUDE-GIT-TAG-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git tag:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-TAG-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for wildcard git tag mutation grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(git tag:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-git-tag-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-git-tag-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC415 / CLAUDE-GIT-BRANCH-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git branch:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-BRANCH-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for wildcard git branch mutation grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(git branch:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-git-branch-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-git-branch-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC416 / MD-CLAUDE-PIP-INSTALL — AI-native markdown models Claude package installation with bare pip install despite explicit uv preference guidance

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-CLAUDE-PIP-INSTALL
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: heuristic
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: This rule depends on transcript-shaped markdown plus explicit uv preference context in the same AI-native document, so the first release stays guidance-only while broader ecosystem usefulness is measured.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs corpus-backed precision review, a non-heuristic graduation basis, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Heuristic preview rule; not a stable contract and may evolve as false-positive tuning improves.

SEC417 / MD-PIP-GIT-UNPINNED — AI-native markdown installs Python packages from an unpinned git+https:// source

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PIP-GIT-UNPINNED
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for pip install examples that pull directly from mutable git+https sources without commit pinning.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact pip install plus git+https:// token analysis with commit-pin detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-unpinned-pip-git-install
  • Benign Corpus: claude-unpinned-pip-git-install-commit-pinned-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC418 / CLAUDE-WEBFETCH-RAW-GITHUB — Claude settings permissions allow WebFetch(domain:raw.githubusercontent.com) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-WEBFETCH-RAW-GITHUB
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for explicit raw GitHub content fetch grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for WebFetch(domain:raw.githubusercontent.com) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-webfetch-raw-github-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-webfetch-raw-github-fixture-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC419 / MD-CURL-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(curl:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-CURL-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for explicit wildcard curl grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(curl:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-curl-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-curl-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC420 / MD-WGET-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(wget:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-WGET-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for explicit wildcard wget grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(wget:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-wget-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-wget-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC421 / MD-GIT-CLONE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git clone:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-CLONE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git clone grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git clone:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-clone-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-clone-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC422 / MCP-COMMAND-SUDO — MCP configuration launches the server through sudo

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-COMMAND-SUDO
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact MCP server launch paths that run under sudo.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact string detection for command: "sudo" on parsed MCP configuration objects.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-sudo
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-command-non-sudo-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC423 / MD-READ-UNSCOPED — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare Read tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-READ-UNSCOPED
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for bare Read grants that omit a reviewed repo-local scope.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for bare Read inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-unscoped-read-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-unscoped-read-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC424 / MD-WRITE-UNSCOPED — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare Write tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-WRITE-UNSCOPED
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for bare Write grants that omit a reviewed repo-local scope.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for bare Write inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-unscoped-write-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-unscoped-write-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC425 / MD-EDIT-UNSCOPED — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare Edit tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-EDIT-UNSCOPED
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for bare Edit grants that omit a reviewed repo-local scope.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for bare Edit inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-unscoped-edit-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-unscoped-edit-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC426 / MD-GLOB-UNSCOPED — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare Glob tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GLOB-UNSCOPED
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for bare Glob grants that omit a reviewed repo-local discovery scope.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for bare Glob inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-unscoped-glob-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-unscoped-glob-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC427 / MD-GREP-UNSCOPED — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants bare Grep tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GREP-UNSCOPED
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for bare Grep grants that omit a reviewed search scope.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for bare Grep inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-unscoped-grep-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-unscoped-grep-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC428 / MD-READ-UNSAFE-PATH — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Read(...) over an unsafe repo-external path

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-READ-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for Read(...) grants scoped to absolute, home-relative, drive-letter, or parent-traversing paths outside the repository boundary.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token analysis for Read(...) scopes with absolute, home-relative, drive-letter, or parent-traversing path markers.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-read-unsafe-path-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-read-unsafe-path-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC429 / MD-WRITE-UNSAFE-PATH — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Write(...) over an unsafe repo-external path

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-WRITE-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for Write(...) grants scoped to absolute, home-relative, drive-letter, or parent-traversing paths outside the repository boundary.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token analysis for Write(...) scopes with absolute, home-relative, drive-letter, or parent-traversing path markers.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-write-unsafe-path-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-write-unsafe-path-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC430 / MD-EDIT-UNSAFE-PATH — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Edit(...) over an unsafe repo-external path

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-EDIT-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for Edit(...) grants scoped to absolute, home-relative, drive-letter, or parent-traversing paths outside the repository boundary.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token analysis for Edit(...) scopes with absolute, home-relative, drive-letter, or parent-traversing path markers.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-edit-unsafe-path-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-edit-unsafe-path-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC431 / MD-GLOB-UNSAFE-PATH — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Glob(...) over an unsafe repo-external path

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GLOB-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for Glob(...) grants scoped to absolute, home-relative, drive-letter, or parent-traversing paths outside the repository boundary.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token analysis for Glob(...) scopes with absolute, home-relative, drive-letter, or parent-traversing path markers.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-glob-unsafe-path-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-glob-unsafe-path-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC432 / MD-GIT-ADD-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git add:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-ADD-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git add grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git add:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-add-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-add-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC433 / MD-GIT-FETCH-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git fetch:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-FETCH-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git fetch grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git fetch:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-fetch-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-fetch-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC434 / MD-WEBFETCH-RAW-GITHUB — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants WebFetch(domain:raw.githubusercontent.com) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-WEBFETCH-RAW-GITHUB
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for explicit raw GitHub content fetch grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for WebFetch(domain:raw.githubusercontent.com) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-webfetch-raw-github-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-webfetch-raw-github-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC435 / MD-GIT-CONFIG-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git config:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-CONFIG-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git config grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git config:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-config-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-config-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC436 / MD-GIT-TAG-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git tag:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-TAG-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git tag grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git tag:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-tag-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-tag-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC437 / MD-GIT-BRANCH-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git branch:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-BRANCH-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git branch grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git branch:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-branch-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-branch-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC438 / MD-GIT-RESET-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git reset:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-RESET-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git reset grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git reset:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-reset-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-reset-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC439 / MD-GIT-CLEAN-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git clean:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-CLEAN-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git clean grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git clean:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-clean-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-clean-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC440 / MD-GIT-RESTORE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git restore:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-RESTORE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git restore grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git restore:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-restore-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-restore-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC441 / MD-GIT-REBASE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git rebase:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-REBASE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git rebase grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git rebase:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-rebase-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-rebase-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC442 / MD-GIT-MERGE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git merge:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-MERGE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git merge grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git merge:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-merge-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-merge-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC443 / MD-GIT-CHERRY-PICK-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git cherry-pick:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-CHERRY-PICK-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git cherry-pick grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git cherry-pick:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-cherry-pick-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-cherry-pick-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC444 / MD-GIT-APPLY-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git apply:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-APPLY-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git apply grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git apply:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-apply-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-apply-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC445 / MD-GIT-AM-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git am:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-AM-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for wildcard git am grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(git am:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-am-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-am-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC446 / MCP-ARGS-SUDO — MCP configuration passes sudo as the first launch argument

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-ARGS-SUDO
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact MCP server launch paths that pass sudo as the first argv element.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact string detection for args[0] == "sudo" on parsed MCP configuration objects.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-args-sudo
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-args-non-sudo-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC447 / MD-PACKAGE-INSTALL-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants package installation authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PACKAGE-INSTALL-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for shared package-install grants in allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for package-install permissions such as Bash(pip install) and Bash(npm install) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-package-install-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-package-command-allowed-tools-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC448 / MD-PIP-TRUSTED-HOST — AI-native markdown installs Python packages with --trusted-host

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PIP-TRUSTED-HOST
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for pip install examples that disable host trust checks with --trusted-host.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact pip install token analysis with --trusted-host detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-pip-trusted-host
  • Benign Corpus: skill-pip-index-url-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC449 / MD-PIP-HTTP-INDEX — AI-native markdown installs Python packages from an insecure http:// package index

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PIP-HTTP-INDEX
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for pip install examples that point package index resolution at http:// sources.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact pip install token analysis with --index-url http:// or --extra-index-url http:// detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-pip-http-index
  • Benign Corpus: skill-pip-https-index-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC450 / MD-NPM-HTTP-REGISTRY — AI-native markdown installs JavaScript packages from an insecure http:// registry

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-NPM-HTTP-REGISTRY
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for npm, pnpm, yarn, and bun install examples that point dependency resolution at http:// registries.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact npm install, npm i, pnpm add/install, yarn add, or bun add token analysis with --registry http:// detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-npm-http-registry
  • Benign Corpus: skill-npm-https-registry-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC451 / MD-CARGO-HTTP-GIT-INSTALL — AI-native markdown installs Rust packages from an insecure http:// git source

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-CARGO-HTTP-GIT-INSTALL
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for cargo install examples that fetch a crate directly from an http:// git source.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact cargo install token analysis with --git http:// detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-cargo-http-git-install
  • Benign Corpus: skill-cargo-https-git-install-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC452 / MD-CARGO-HTTP-INDEX — AI-native markdown installs Rust packages from an insecure http:// index

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-CARGO-HTTP-INDEX
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for cargo install examples that resolve crates through an http:// index.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact cargo install token analysis with --index http:// detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-cargo-http-index
  • Benign Corpus: skill-cargo-https-index-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC453 / MD-PIP-HTTP-SOURCE — AI-native markdown installs Python packages from an insecure direct http:// source

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PIP-HTTP-SOURCE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for pip install examples that fetch a direct package source over http://.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact pip install token analysis with direct http:// source detection inside parsed markdown regions, excluding --index-url and --extra-index-url forms already covered by SEC449.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-pip-http-source
  • Benign Corpus: skill-pip-https-source-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC454 / MD-NPM-HTTP-SOURCE — AI-native markdown installs JavaScript packages from an insecure direct http:// source

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-NPM-HTTP-SOURCE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for npm, pnpm, yarn, and bun install examples that fetch a direct package source over http://.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact npm install, npm i, pnpm add/install, yarn add, or bun add token analysis with direct http:// source detection inside parsed markdown regions, excluding --registry http:// forms already covered by SEC450.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-npm-http-source
  • Benign Corpus: skill-npm-https-source-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC455 / MD-PIP-HTTP-GIT-INSTALL — AI-native markdown installs Python packages from an insecure git+http:// source

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PIP-HTTP-GIT-INSTALL
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for pip install examples that fetch Python packages from an insecure git+http:// source.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact pip install token analysis with git+http:// detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-pip-http-git-install
  • Benign Corpus: skill-pip-https-git-install-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.
  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PIP-HTTP-FIND-LINKS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for pip install examples that point package discovery at http:// find-links sources.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact pip install token analysis with --find-links http://, --find-links=http://, or -f http:// detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-pip-http-find-links
  • Benign Corpus: skill-pip-https-find-links-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC457 / MD-JS-PACKAGE-STRICT-SSL-FALSE — AI-native markdown disables strict SSL verification for JavaScript package manager config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-JS-PACKAGE-STRICT-SSL-FALSE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for JavaScript package-manager config commands that explicitly disable strict SSL verification.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact npm config set, pnpm config set, or yarn config set token analysis with strict-ssl false or strict-ssl=false detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-js-package-strict-ssl-false
  • Benign Corpus: skill-js-package-strict-ssl-true-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC458 / MD-PIP-CONFIG-HTTP-INDEX — AI-native markdown configures Python package resolution with an insecure http:// package index

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PIP-CONFIG-HTTP-INDEX
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for pip config set commands that point package index configuration at http:// sources.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact pip config set, pip3 config set, or python -m pip config set token analysis with global.index-url http:// or global.extra-index-url http:// detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-pip-config-http-index
  • Benign Corpus: skill-pip-config-https-index-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC459 / MD-JS-PACKAGE-CONFIG-HTTP-REGISTRY — AI-native markdown configures a JavaScript package manager with an insecure http:// registry

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-JS-PACKAGE-CONFIG-HTTP-REGISTRY
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for JavaScript package-manager config commands that point registry configuration at http:// sources.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact npm config set, pnpm config set, or yarn config set token analysis with registry http:// or registry=http:// detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-js-package-config-http-registry
  • Benign Corpus: skill-js-package-config-https-registry-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.
  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PIP-CONFIG-HTTP-FIND-LINKS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for pip config set commands that point package discovery configuration at http:// find-links sources.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact pip config set, pip3 config set, or python -m pip config set token analysis with global.find-links http:// detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-pip-config-http-find-links
  • Benign Corpus: skill-pip-config-https-find-links-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC461 / MD-PIP-CONFIG-TRUSTED-HOST — AI-native markdown configures Python package resolution with trusted-host

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PIP-CONFIG-TRUSTED-HOST
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for pip config set commands that configure trusted-host bypass behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact pip config set, pip3 config set, or python -m pip config set token analysis with global.trusted-host detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-pip-config-trusted-host
  • Benign Corpus: skill-pip-config-unrelated-key-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC462 / MD-NETWORK-TLS-BYPASS — AI-native markdown disables TLS verification for a network-capable command

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-NETWORK-TLS-BYPASS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for exact network-command examples that disable TLS verification, including PowerShell certificate-bypass forms.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact command-token analysis with --insecure, -k, --no-check-certificate, -SkipCertificateCheck, or NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 detection inside parsed markdown regions, with safety-guidance suppression.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-markdown-network-tls-bypass, skill-markdown-network-tls-bypass-powershell
  • Benign Corpus: skill-markdown-network-tls-bypass-warning-safe, skill-markdown-network-tls-bypass-powershell-warning-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC463 / MD-SUDO-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(sudo:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-SUDO-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for explicit wildcard sudo grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(sudo:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-sudo-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-sudo-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC464 / MD-GIT-HTTP-CLONE — AI-native markdown clones a Git repository from an insecure http:// source

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-HTTP-CLONE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for git clone examples that fetch repositories directly from an insecure http:// source.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact git clone token analysis with direct http:// source detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-http-clone
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-https-clone-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC465 / MD-GIT-HTTP-REMOTE — AI-native markdown configures a Git remote with an insecure http:// source

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-HTTP-REMOTE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for git remote add examples that configure a repository remote through an insecure http:// source.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact git remote add token analysis with direct http:// source detection inside parsed markdown regions.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-http-remote
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-https-remote-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC466 / MD-RM-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(rm:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-RM-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for explicit wildcard rm grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(rm:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-rm-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-rm-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC467 / MD-CHMOD-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(chmod:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-CHMOD-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for explicit wildcard chmod grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(chmod:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-chmod-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-chmod-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC468 / MD-CHOWN-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(chown:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-CHOWN-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for explicit wildcard chown grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(chown:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-chown-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-chown-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC469 / MD-CHGRP-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(chgrp:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-CHGRP-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for explicit wildcard chgrp grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(chgrp:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-chgrp-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-chgrp-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC470 / MD-SU-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(su:*) authority

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-SU-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for explicit wildcard su grants in shared allowed-tools policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(su:*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-su-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-su-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC471 / MD-GIT-SSLVERIFY-FALSE — AI-native markdown disables Git TLS verification with http.sslVerify false

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-SSLVERIFY-FALSE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for exact git config examples that disable Git TLS verification through http.sslVerify false.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact git config token analysis with http.sslVerify false or http.sslVerify=false detection inside parsed markdown regions, excluding safety-warning phrasing.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-sslverify-false
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-sslverify-true-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC472 / MD-GIT-SSL-NO-VERIFY — AI-native markdown disables Git TLS verification with GIT_SSL_NO_VERIFY

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-SSL-NO-VERIFY
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for exact Git command examples that disable TLS verification through GIT_SSL_NO_VERIFY.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact GIT_SSL_NO_VERIFY=1 or GIT_SSL_NO_VERIFY=true token analysis when a Git command appears in the same parsed markdown region, excluding safety-warning phrasing.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-ssl-no-verify
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-ssl-no-verify-disabled-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC473 / MD-GIT-INLINE-SSLVERIFY-FALSE — AI-native markdown disables Git TLS verification with git -c http.sslVerify=false

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-INLINE-SSLVERIFY-FALSE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown for exact git -c examples that disable Git TLS verification inline through http.sslVerify=false.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact git -c http.sslVerify=false token analysis inside parsed markdown regions, excluding safety-warning phrasing.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-git-inline-sslverify-false
  • Benign Corpus: skill-git-inline-sslverify-true-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC474 / MD-GH-PR-PERMISSION — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh pr:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-PR-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub pull-request authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh pr:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-pr-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-pr-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC475 / CLAUDE-READ-UNSAFE-PATH — Claude settings permissions allow Read(...) over an unsafe path in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-READ-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for exact unsafe-path Read(...) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission-scope detection for Read(...) entries that target absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified paths inside parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-unsafe-path-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-unsafe-path-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC476 / CLAUDE-WRITE-UNSAFE-PATH — Claude settings permissions allow Write(...) over an unsafe path in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-WRITE-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for exact unsafe-path Write(...) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission-scope detection for Write(...) entries that target absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified paths inside parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-unsafe-path-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-unsafe-path-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC477 / CLAUDE-EDIT-UNSAFE-PATH — Claude settings permissions allow Edit(...) over an unsafe path in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-EDIT-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for exact unsafe-path Edit(...) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission-scope detection for Edit(...) entries that target absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified paths inside parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-unsafe-path-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-unsafe-path-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC478 / CLAUDE-GIT-RESET-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git reset:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-RESET-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git reset:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git reset:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC479 / CLAUDE-GIT-CLEAN-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git clean:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-CLEAN-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git clean:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git clean:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC480 / CLAUDE-GIT-RESTORE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git restore:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-RESTORE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git restore:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git restore:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC481 / CLAUDE-GIT-REBASE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git rebase:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-REBASE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git rebase:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git rebase:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC482 / CLAUDE-GIT-MERGE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git merge:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-MERGE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git merge:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git merge:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC483 / CLAUDE-GIT-CHERRY-PICK-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git cherry-pick:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-CHERRY-PICK-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git cherry-pick:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git cherry-pick:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC484 / CLAUDE-GIT-APPLY-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git apply:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-APPLY-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git apply:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git apply:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC485 / CLAUDE-GIT-AM-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(git am:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GIT-AM-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(git am:*) authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(git am:*) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-destructive-git-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC486 / CLAUDE-GLOB-UNSAFE-PATH — Claude settings permissions allow Glob(...) over an unsafe path in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GLOB-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for exact unsafe-path Glob(...) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission-scope detection for Glob(...) entries that target absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified paths inside parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-glob-grep-unsafe-path-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-unsafe-path-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC487 / CLAUDE-GREP-UNSAFE-PATH — Claude settings permissions allow Grep(...) over an unsafe path in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GREP-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for exact unsafe-path Grep(...) grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission-scope detection for Grep(...) entries that target absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified paths inside parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-glob-grep-unsafe-path-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-unsafe-path-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC488 / CLAUDE-UVX-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(uvx ...) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-UVX-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(uvx ...) mutable package-runner authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(uvx ...) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-mutable-runner-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-package-runner-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC489 / CLAUDE-PNPM-DLX-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(pnpm dlx ...) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-PNPM-DLX-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(pnpm dlx ...) mutable package-runner authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(pnpm dlx ...) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-mutable-runner-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-package-runner-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC490 / CLAUDE-YARN-DLX-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(yarn dlx ...) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-YARN-DLX-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(yarn dlx ...) mutable package-runner authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(yarn dlx ...) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-mutable-runner-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-package-runner-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC491 / CLAUDE-PIPX-RUN-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(pipx run ...) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-PIPX-RUN-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(pipx run ...) mutable package-runner authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(pipx run ...) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-mutable-runner-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-package-runner-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC492 / CLAUDE-NPM-EXEC-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(npm exec ...) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-NPM-EXEC-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(npm exec ...) mutable package-runner authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(npm exec ...) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-npm-exec-bunx-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-npm-exec-bunx-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC493 / CLAUDE-BUNX-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(bunx ...) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-BUNX-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared committed Claude settings for exact Bash(bunx ...) mutable package-runner authority.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact permission detection for Bash(bunx ...) entries inside permissions.allow.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-npm-exec-bunx-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-npm-exec-bunx-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC494 / MD-NPM-EXEC-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(npm exec:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-NPM-EXEC-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact mutable npm exec authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(npm exec:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-npm-exec-bunx-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-npm-exec-bunx-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC495 / MD-BUNX-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(bunx:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-BUNX-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact mutable bunx authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(bunx:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-npm-exec-bunx-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-npm-exec-bunx-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC496 / MD-UVX-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(uvx:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-UVX-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact mutable uvx authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(uvx:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-uvx-dlx-pipx-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-uvx-dlx-pipx-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC497 / MD-PNPM-DLX-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(pnpm dlx:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PNPM-DLX-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact mutable pnpm dlx authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(pnpm dlx:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-uvx-dlx-pipx-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-uvx-dlx-pipx-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC498 / MD-YARN-DLX-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(yarn dlx:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-YARN-DLX-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact mutable yarn dlx authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(yarn dlx:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-uvx-dlx-pipx-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-uvx-dlx-pipx-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC499 / MD-PIPX-RUN-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(pipx run:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-PIPX-RUN-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact mutable pipx run authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(pipx run:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-uvx-dlx-pipx-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-uvx-dlx-pipx-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC500 / MD-NPX-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(npx:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-NPX-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact mutable npx authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(npx:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-npx-git-ls-remote-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-npx-git-ls-remote-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC501 / MD-GIT-LS-REMOTE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(git ls-remote:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GIT-LS-REMOTE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact remote repository inspection authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(git ls-remote:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-npx-git-ls-remote-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-npx-git-ls-remote-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC502 / CLAUDE-GH-API-POST-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh api --method POST:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-API-POST-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub API POST mutation authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh api --method POST:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-mutation-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-mutation-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC503 / CLAUDE-GH-ISSUE-CREATE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh issue create:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-ISSUE-CREATE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub issue creation authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh issue create:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-mutation-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-mutation-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC504 / CLAUDE-GH-REPO-CREATE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh repo create:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-REPO-CREATE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub repository creation authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh repo create:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-mutation-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-mutation-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC505 / MD-GH-API-POST-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh api --method POST:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-API-POST-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub API POST mutation authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh api --method POST:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-mutation-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-mutation-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC506 / MD-GH-ISSUE-CREATE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh issue create:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-ISSUE-CREATE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub issue creation authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh issue create:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-mutation-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-mutation-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC507 / MD-GH-REPO-CREATE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh repo create:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-REPO-CREATE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub repository creation authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh repo create:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-mutation-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-mutation-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC508 / CLAUDE-GH-SECRET-SET-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh secret set:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-SECRET-SET-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub secret mutation authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh secret set:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-secret-variable-workflow-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-secret-variable-workflow-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC509 / CLAUDE-GH-VARIABLE-SET-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh variable set:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-VARIABLE-SET-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub variable mutation authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh variable set:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-secret-variable-workflow-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-secret-variable-workflow-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC510 / CLAUDE-GH-WORKFLOW-RUN-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh workflow run:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-WORKFLOW-RUN-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub workflow dispatch authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh workflow run:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-secret-variable-workflow-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-secret-variable-workflow-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC511 / MD-GH-SECRET-SET-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh secret set:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-SECRET-SET-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub secret mutation authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh secret set:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-secret-variable-workflow-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-secret-variable-workflow-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC512 / MD-GH-VARIABLE-SET-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh variable set:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-VARIABLE-SET-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub variable mutation authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh variable set:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-secret-variable-workflow-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-secret-variable-workflow-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC513 / MD-GH-WORKFLOW-RUN-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh workflow run:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-WORKFLOW-RUN-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub workflow dispatch authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh workflow run:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-secret-variable-workflow-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-secret-variable-workflow-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC514 / CLAUDE-GH-SECRET-DELETE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh secret delete:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-SECRET-DELETE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub secret deletion authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh secret delete:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-mutation-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-mutation-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC515 / CLAUDE-GH-VARIABLE-DELETE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh variable delete:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-VARIABLE-DELETE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub variable deletion authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh variable delete:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-mutation-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-mutation-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC516 / CLAUDE-GH-WORKFLOW-DISABLE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh workflow disable:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-WORKFLOW-DISABLE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub workflow disable authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh workflow disable:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-mutation-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-mutation-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC517 / MD-GH-SECRET-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh secret delete:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-SECRET-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub secret deletion authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh secret delete:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-mutation-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-mutation-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC518 / MD-GH-VARIABLE-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh variable delete:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-VARIABLE-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub variable deletion authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh variable delete:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-mutation-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-mutation-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC519 / MD-GH-WORKFLOW-DISABLE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh workflow disable:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-WORKFLOW-DISABLE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub workflow disable authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh workflow disable:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-mutation-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-mutation-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC520 / MD-READ-WILDCARD — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Read(*) wildcard access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-READ-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for exact Read(*) grants that expose unconstrained reading as shared default policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Read(*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC521 / MD-WRITE-WILDCARD — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Write(*) wildcard access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-WRITE-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for exact Write(*) grants that expose unconstrained mutation as shared default policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Write(*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC522 / MD-EDIT-WILDCARD — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Edit(*) wildcard access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-EDIT-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for exact Edit(*) grants that expose unconstrained editing as shared default policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Edit(*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC523 / MD-GLOB-WILDCARD — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Glob(*) wildcard access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GLOB-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for exact Glob(*) grants that expose unconstrained file discovery as shared default policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Glob(*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC524 / MD-GREP-WILDCARD — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Grep(*) wildcard access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GREP-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for exact Grep(*) grants that expose unconstrained content search as shared default policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Grep(*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC525 / MD-WEBFETCH-WILDCARD — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants WebFetch(*) wildcard access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-WEBFETCH-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for exact WebFetch(*) grants that expose unconstrained remote fetch authority as shared default policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for WebFetch(*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC526 / MD-WEBSEARCH-WILDCARD — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants WebSearch(*) wildcard access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-WEBSEARCH-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for exact WebSearch(*) grants that expose unconstrained search authority as shared default policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for WebSearch(*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-core-wildcard-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC527 / MD-BASH-WILDCARD — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(*) wildcard access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-BASH-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, skills
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native frontmatter for exact Bash(*) grants that expose unconstrained shell execution as shared default policy.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter token detection for Bash(*) inside allowed-tools or allowed_tools.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-bash-wildcard-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-bash-wildcard-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC528 / CLAUDE-GH-API-DELETE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh api --method DELETE:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-API-DELETE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub API DELETE mutation authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh api --method DELETE:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-api-delete-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-api-delete-permission-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC529 / MD-GH-API-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh api --method DELETE:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-API-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub API DELETE mutation authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh api --method DELETE:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-api-delete-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-api-delete-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC530 / CLAUDE-GH-API-PATCH-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh api --method PATCH:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-API-PATCH-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub API PATCH mutation authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh api --method PATCH:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-api-patch-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-api-patch-permission-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC531 / CLAUDE-GH-API-PUT-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh api --method PUT:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-API-PUT-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub API PUT mutation authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh api --method PUT:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-api-put-permission
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-api-put-permission-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC532 / MD-GH-API-PATCH-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh api --method PATCH:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-API-PATCH-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub API PATCH mutation authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh api --method PATCH:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-api-patch-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-api-patch-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC533 / MD-GH-API-PUT-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh api --method PUT:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-API-PUT-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub API PUT mutation authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh api --method PUT:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-api-put-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-api-put-allowed-tools-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC534 / CLAUDE-GH-REPO-DELETE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh repo delete:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-REPO-DELETE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub repository deletion authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh repo delete:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-repo-release-delete-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-repo-release-delete-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC535 / MD-GH-REPO-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh repo delete:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-REPO-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub repository deletion authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh repo delete:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-repo-release-delete-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-repo-release-delete-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC536 / CLAUDE-GH-RELEASE-DELETE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh release delete:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-RELEASE-DELETE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub release deletion authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh release delete:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-repo-release-delete-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-repo-release-delete-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC537 / MD-GH-RELEASE-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh release delete:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-RELEASE-DELETE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub release deletion authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh release delete:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-repo-release-delete-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-repo-release-delete-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC538 / CLAUDE-GH-REPO-EDIT-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh repo edit:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-REPO-EDIT-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub repository settings mutation authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh repo edit:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-repo-edit-release-create-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-repo-edit-release-create-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC539 / MD-GH-REPO-EDIT-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh repo edit:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-REPO-EDIT-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub repository settings mutation authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh repo edit:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-repo-edit-release-create-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-repo-edit-release-create-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC540 / CLAUDE-GH-RELEASE-CREATE-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh release create:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-RELEASE-CREATE-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub release creation authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh release create:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-repo-edit-release-create-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-repo-edit-release-create-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC541 / MD-GH-RELEASE-CREATE-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh release create:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-RELEASE-CREATE-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub release creation authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh release create:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-repo-edit-release-create-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-repo-edit-release-create-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC542 / CLAUDE-GH-REPO-TRANSFER-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh repo transfer:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-REPO-TRANSFER-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub repository transfer authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh repo transfer:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-repo-transfer-release-upload-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-repo-transfer-release-upload-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC543 / MD-GH-REPO-TRANSFER-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh repo transfer:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-REPO-TRANSFER-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub repository transfer authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh repo transfer:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-repo-transfer-release-upload-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-repo-transfer-release-upload-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC544 / CLAUDE-GH-RELEASE-UPLOAD-PERMISSION — Claude settings permissions allow Bash(gh release upload:*) in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GH-RELEASE-UPLOAD-PERMISSION
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings for exact GitHub release asset upload authority through permissions.allow.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for Bash(gh release upload:*) inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-gh-repo-transfer-release-upload-permissions
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-gh-repo-transfer-release-upload-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC545 / MD-GH-RELEASE-UPLOAD-ALLOWED-TOOLS — AI-native markdown frontmatter grants Bash(gh release upload:*) tool access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MD-GH-RELEASE-UPLOAD-ALLOWED-TOOLS
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: markdown
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: governance
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: governance
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks AI-native markdown frontmatter for exact GitHub release asset upload authority through allowed-tools.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: MarkdownSignals exact frontmatter string detection for Bash(gh release upload:*) in allowed-tools entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: skill-gh-repo-transfer-release-upload-allowed-tools
  • Benign Corpus: skill-gh-repo-transfer-release-upload-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC546 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-BASH-WILDCARD — MCP configuration auto-approves blanket shell execution with autoApprove: ["Bash(*)"]

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-BASH-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit blanket shell auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-bash-wildcard
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-bash-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC547 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CURL — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(curl:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CURL
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit curl auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(curl:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-curl-wget
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-curl-wget-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC548 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WGET — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(wget:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WGET
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit wget auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(wget:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-curl-wget
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-curl-wget-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC549 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-SUDO — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(sudo:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-SUDO
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact sudo auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(sudo:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-sudo-rm
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-sudo-rm-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC550 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-RM — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(rm:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-RM
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact destructive rm auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(rm:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-sudo-rm
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-sudo-rm-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC551 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-PUSH — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git push) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-PUSH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact git push auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git push)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-push-gh-api-post
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-push-gh-api-post-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC552 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-API-POST — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh api --method POST:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-API-POST
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact GitHub API POST auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh api --method POST:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-push-gh-api-post
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-push-gh-api-post-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC553 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CHECKOUT — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git checkout:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CHECKOUT
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact git checkout auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git checkout:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-destructive-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-destructive-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC554 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-COMMIT — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git commit:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-COMMIT
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact git commit auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git commit:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-destructive-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-destructive-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC555 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-RESET — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git reset:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-RESET
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact git reset auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git reset:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-destructive-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-destructive-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC556 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CLEAN — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git clean:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CLEAN
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact git clean auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git clean:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-destructive-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-destructive-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC557 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-API-DELETE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh api --method DELETE:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-API-DELETE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact GitHub API DELETE auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh api --method DELETE:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-api-mutation-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-api-mutation-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC558 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-API-PATCH — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh api --method PATCH:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-API-PATCH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact GitHub API PATCH auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh api --method PATCH:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-api-mutation-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-api-mutation-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC559 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-API-PUT — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh api --method PUT:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-API-PUT
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact GitHub API PUT auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh api --method PUT:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-api-mutation-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-api-mutation-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC560 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-ISSUE-CREATE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh issue create:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-ISSUE-CREATE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh issue create auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh issue create:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC561 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-REPO-CREATE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh repo create:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-REPO-CREATE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh repo create auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh repo create:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC562 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-REPO-DELETE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh repo delete:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-REPO-DELETE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh repo delete auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh repo delete:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC563 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-REPO-EDIT — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh repo edit:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-REPO-EDIT
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh repo edit auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh repo edit:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC564 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-SECRET-SET — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh secret set:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-SECRET-SET
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh secret set auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh secret set:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC565 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-VARIABLE-SET — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh variable set:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-VARIABLE-SET
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh variable set auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh variable set:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC566 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-WORKFLOW-RUN — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh workflow run:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-WORKFLOW-RUN
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh workflow run auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh workflow run:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-mutation-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC567 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-READ-WILDCARD — MCP configuration auto-approves Read(*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-READ-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit Read(*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Read(*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC568 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WRITE-WILDCARD — MCP configuration auto-approves Write(*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WRITE-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit Write(*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Write(*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC569 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-EDIT-WILDCARD — MCP configuration auto-approves Edit(*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-EDIT-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit Edit(*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Edit(*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC570 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GLOB-WILDCARD — MCP configuration auto-approves Glob(*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GLOB-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit Glob(*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Glob(*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC571 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GREP-WILDCARD — MCP configuration auto-approves Grep(*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GREP-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit Grep(*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Grep(*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC572 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBFETCH-WILDCARD — MCP configuration auto-approves WebFetch(*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBFETCH-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit WebFetch(*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["WebFetch(*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC573 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBSEARCH-WILDCARD — MCP configuration auto-approves WebSearch(*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBSEARCH-WILDCARD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit WebSearch(*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["WebSearch(*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-wildcard-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC574 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-READ-UNSAFE-PATH — MCP configuration auto-approves Read(...) over an unsafe path through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-READ-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact unsafe-path Read(...) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item predicate detection for autoApprove entries where Read(...) targets an absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified path.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unsafe-path-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unsafe-path-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC575 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WRITE-UNSAFE-PATH — MCP configuration auto-approves Write(...) over an unsafe path through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WRITE-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact unsafe-path Write(...) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item predicate detection for autoApprove entries where Write(...) targets an absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified path.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unsafe-path-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unsafe-path-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC576 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-EDIT-UNSAFE-PATH — MCP configuration auto-approves Edit(...) over an unsafe path through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-EDIT-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact unsafe-path Edit(...) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item predicate detection for autoApprove entries where Edit(...) targets an absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified path.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unsafe-path-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unsafe-path-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC577 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GLOB-UNSAFE-PATH — MCP configuration auto-approves Glob(...) over an unsafe path through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GLOB-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact unsafe-path Glob(...) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item predicate detection for autoApprove entries where Glob(...) targets an absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified path.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unsafe-path-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unsafe-path-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC578 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GREP-UNSAFE-PATH — MCP configuration auto-approves Grep(...) over an unsafe path through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GREP-UNSAFE-PATH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact unsafe-path Grep(...) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item predicate detection for autoApprove entries where Grep(...) targets an absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified path.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unsafe-path-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unsafe-path-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC579 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-SECRET-DELETE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh secret delete:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-SECRET-DELETE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh secret delete auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh secret delete:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-delete-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-delete-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC580 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-VARIABLE-DELETE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh variable delete:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-VARIABLE-DELETE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh variable delete auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh variable delete:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-delete-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-delete-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC581 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-WORKFLOW-DISABLE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh workflow disable:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-WORKFLOW-DISABLE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh workflow disable auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh workflow disable:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-delete-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-delete-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC582 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-REPO-TRANSFER — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh repo transfer:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-REPO-TRANSFER
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh repo transfer auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh repo transfer:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-release-transfer-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-release-transfer-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC583 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-RELEASE-CREATE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh release create:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-RELEASE-CREATE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh release create auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh release create:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-release-transfer-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-release-transfer-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC584 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-RELEASE-DELETE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh release delete:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-RELEASE-DELETE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh release delete auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh release delete:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-release-transfer-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-release-transfer-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC585 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-RELEASE-UPLOAD — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh release upload:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-RELEASE-UPLOAD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact gh release upload auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh release upload:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-release-transfer-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-gh-release-transfer-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC586 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-NPX — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(npx ...) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-NPX
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(npx ...) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item prefix detection for autoApprove entries starting with Bash(npx on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC587 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-UVX — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(uvx ...) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-UVX
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(uvx ...) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item prefix detection for autoApprove entries starting with Bash(uvx on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC588 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-NPM-EXEC — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(npm exec ...) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-NPM-EXEC
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(npm exec ...) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item prefix detection for autoApprove entries starting with Bash(npm exec on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC589 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-BUNX — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(bunx ...) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-BUNX
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(bunx ...) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item prefix detection for autoApprove entries starting with Bash(bunx on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC590 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-PNPM-DLX — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(pnpm dlx ...) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-PNPM-DLX
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(pnpm dlx ...) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item prefix detection for autoApprove entries starting with Bash(pnpm dlx on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC591 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-YARN-DLX — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(yarn dlx ...) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-YARN-DLX
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(yarn dlx ...) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item prefix detection for autoApprove entries starting with Bash(yarn dlx on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC592 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-PIPX-RUN — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(pipx run ...) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-PIPX-RUN
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(pipx run ...) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item prefix detection for autoApprove entries starting with Bash(pipx run on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-mutable-runner-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC593 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-PACKAGE-INSTALL — MCP configuration auto-approves package installation commands through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-PACKAGE-INSTALL
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact package installation auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for package installation entries such as Bash(pip install) and Bash(npm install) inside autoApprove on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-package-install-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-package-install-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC594 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CLONE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git clone:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CLONE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git clone:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git clone:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-fetch-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-fetch-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC595 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-FETCH — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git fetch:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-FETCH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git fetch:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git fetch:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-fetch-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-fetch-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC596 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-LS-REMOTE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git ls-remote:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-LS-REMOTE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git ls-remote:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git ls-remote:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-fetch-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-fetch-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC597 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-ADD — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git add:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-ADD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git add:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git add:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-management-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-management-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC598 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CONFIG — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git config:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CONFIG
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git config:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git config:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-management-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-management-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC599 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-TAG — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git tag:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-TAG
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git tag:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git tag:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-management-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-management-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC600 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-BRANCH — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git branch:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-BRANCH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git branch:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git branch:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-management-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-management-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC601 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-PR — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(gh pr:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GH-PR
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(gh pr:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(gh pr:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-management-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-repo-management-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC602 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-STASH — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git stash:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-STASH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git stash:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git stash:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC603 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-RESTORE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git restore:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-RESTORE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git restore:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git restore:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC604 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-REBASE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git rebase:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-REBASE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git rebase:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git rebase:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC605 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-MERGE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git merge:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-MERGE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git merge:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git merge:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC606 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CHERRY-PICK — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git cherry-pick:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-CHERRY-PICK
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git cherry-pick:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git cherry-pick:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC607 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-APPLY — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git apply:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-APPLY
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git apply:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git apply:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC608 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-AM — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(git am:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GIT-AM
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(git am:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(git am:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-git-history-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC609 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CRONTAB — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(crontab:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CRONTAB
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(crontab:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(crontab:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-persistence-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-persistence-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC610 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-SYSTEMCTL-ENABLE — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(systemctl enable:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-SYSTEMCTL-ENABLE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(systemctl enable:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(systemctl enable:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-persistence-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-persistence-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC611 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-LAUNCHCTL-LOAD — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(launchctl load:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-LAUNCHCTL-LOAD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(launchctl load:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(launchctl load:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-persistence-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-persistence-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC612 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-LAUNCHCTL-BOOTSTRAP — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(launchctl bootstrap:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-LAUNCHCTL-BOOTSTRAP
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(launchctl bootstrap:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(launchctl bootstrap:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-persistence-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-persistence-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC613 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CHMOD — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(chmod:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CHMOD
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(chmod:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(chmod:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-privileged-shell-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-privileged-shell-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC614 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CHOWN — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(chown:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CHOWN
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(chown:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(chown:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-privileged-shell-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-privileged-shell-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC615 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CHGRP — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(chgrp:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-CHGRP
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(chgrp:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(chgrp:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-privileged-shell-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-privileged-shell-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC616 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-SU — MCP configuration auto-approves Bash(su:*) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-SU
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact Bash(su:*) auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash(su:*)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-privileged-shell-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-privileged-shell-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC617 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBFETCH-RAW-GITHUB — MCP configuration auto-approves WebFetch(domain:raw.githubusercontent.com) through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBFETCH-RAW-GITHUB
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact raw GitHub WebFetch auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["WebFetch(domain:raw.githubusercontent.com)"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-webfetch-raw-github
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-webfetch-raw-github-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC618 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-READ — MCP configuration auto-approves bare Read through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-READ
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact bare Read auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for bare Read in parsed autoApprove entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC619 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WRITE — MCP configuration auto-approves bare Write through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WRITE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact bare Write auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for bare Write in parsed autoApprove entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC620 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-EDIT — MCP configuration auto-approves bare Edit through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-EDIT
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact bare Edit auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for bare Edit in parsed autoApprove entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC621 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GLOB — MCP configuration auto-approves bare Glob through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GLOB
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact bare Glob auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for bare Glob in parsed autoApprove entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC622 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GREP — MCP configuration auto-approves bare Grep through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-GREP
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact bare Grep auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for bare Grep in parsed autoApprove entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC623 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBFETCH — MCP configuration auto-approves bare WebFetch through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBFETCH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact bare WebFetch auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for bare WebFetch in parsed autoApprove entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC624 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBSEARCH — MCP configuration auto-approves bare WebSearch through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WEBSEARCH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact bare WebSearch auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for bare WebSearch in parsed autoApprove entries.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC625 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-BASH — MCP configuration auto-approves bare Bash through autoApprove

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-BASH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches exact bare Bash auto-approval in MCP client config.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals exact array-item detection for autoApprove: ["Bash"] on parsed MCP configuration.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-autoapprove-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC626 / CLAUDE-BASH — Claude settings permissions allow bare Bash in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-BASH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for exact bare Bash grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for bare Bash inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-bash-wildcard
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-bash-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC627 / CLAUDE-READ — Claude settings permissions allow bare Read in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-READ
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for exact bare Read grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for bare Read inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC628 / CLAUDE-WRITE — Claude settings permissions allow bare Write in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-WRITE
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for exact bare Write grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for bare Write inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC629 / CLAUDE-EDIT — Claude settings permissions allow bare Edit in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-EDIT
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for exact bare Edit grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for bare Edit inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC630 / CLAUDE-GLOB — Claude settings permissions allow bare Glob in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GLOB
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for exact bare Glob grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for bare Glob inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC631 / CLAUDE-GREP — Claude settings permissions allow bare Grep in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-GREP
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for exact bare Grep grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for bare Grep inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC632 / CLAUDE-WEBFETCH — Claude settings permissions allow bare WebFetch in a shared committed config

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: CLAUDE-WEBFETCH
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: preview, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks shared Claude settings permissions for exact bare WebFetch grants.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals exact string detection for bare WebFetch inside permissions.allow on parsed Claude settings JSON.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-tool-family
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-unscoped-tool-family-specific-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC633 — Hook script attempts destructive root deletion

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit rm-style destructive root deletion payloads in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals shell-token analysis over non-comment hook lines for rm with recursive+force flags targeting / or using --no-preserve-root.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC634 — Hook script accesses a sensitive system password file

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches direct access to sensitive password and sudo policy files in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals path detection over non-comment hook lines for /etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, /etc/sudoers, /etc/gshadow, or /etc/master.passwd.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC635 — Hook script writes to a shell profile startup file

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit shell startup profile modification in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals redirection-or-tee detection over .bashrc, .bash_profile, .zshrc, or .profile targets in non-comment hook lines.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC636 — Hook script writes to SSH authorized_keys

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit writes to SSH authorized_keys in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals redirection-or-tee detection for authorized_keys targets in non-comment hook lines.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC637 — MCP configuration command attempts destructive root deletion

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit rm-style destructive root deletion payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for rm with recursive+force flags targeting / or using --no-preserve-root.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC638 — MCP configuration command accesses a sensitive system password file

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for direct access to sensitive password and sudo policy files.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args path detection over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for /etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, /etc/sudoers, /etc/gshadow, or /etc/master.passwd.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC639 — MCP configuration command writes to a shell profile startup file

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit writes to shell startup profile files.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig using redirection-or-tee targeting of .bashrc, .bash_profile, .zshrc, or .profile.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC640 — MCP configuration command writes to SSH authorized_keys

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit writes to SSH authorized_keys.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig using redirection-or-tee targeting of authorized_keys.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC641 — Claude settings command hook attempts destructive root deletion

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit rm-style destructive root deletion payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for rm with recursive+force flags targeting / or using --no-preserve-root.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC642 — Claude settings command hook accesses a sensitive system password file

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for direct access to sensitive password and sudo policy files.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook path detection over committed hook entries with type == command for /etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, /etc/sudoers, /etc/gshadow, or /etc/master.passwd.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC643 — Claude settings command hook writes to a shell profile startup file

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit writes to shell startup profile files.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook analysis over committed hook entries with type == command using redirection-or-tee targeting of .bashrc, .bash_profile, .zshrc, or .profile.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC644 — Claude settings command hook writes to SSH authorized_keys

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit writes to SSH authorized_keys.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook analysis over committed hook entries with type == command using redirection-or-tee targeting of authorized_keys.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC645 — Plugin hook command attempts destructive root deletion

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit rm-style destructive root deletion payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for rm with recursive+force flags targeting / or using --no-preserve-root.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC646 — Plugin hook command accesses a sensitive system password file

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for direct access to sensitive password and sudo policy files.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string path detection over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for /etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, /etc/sudoers, /etc/gshadow, or /etc/master.passwd.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC647 — Plugin hook command writes to a shell profile startup file

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit writes to shell startup profile files.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks using redirection-or-tee targeting of .bashrc, .bash_profile, .zshrc, or .profile.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC648 — Plugin hook command writes to SSH authorized_keys

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit writes to SSH authorized_keys.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks using redirection-or-tee targeting of authorized_keys.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-persistence-escalation
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC649 — Hook script manipulates cron persistence

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit cron manipulation or cron file writes in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-or-write-target detection over non-comment hook lines for crontab mutation or writes to /etc/cron* and /var/spool/cron.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-service-persistence
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC650 — Hook script registers a systemd service or unit for persistence

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit systemd service registration or unit-file writes in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-or-write-target detection over non-comment hook lines for systemctl enable|link or writes to systemd unit paths.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-service-persistence
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC651 — Hook script registers a launchd plist for persistence

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit launchd registration or LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist writes in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-or-write-target detection over non-comment hook lines for launchctl load|bootstrap or writes to LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist paths.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-service-persistence
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC652 — MCP configuration command manipulates cron persistence

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit cron persistence setup.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for crontab mutation or writes to cron persistence paths.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-service-persistence
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC653 — MCP configuration command registers a systemd service or unit for persistence

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit systemd service registration or unit-file writes.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for systemctl enable|link or writes to systemd unit paths.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-service-persistence
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC654 — MCP configuration command registers a launchd plist for persistence

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit launchd registration or LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist writes.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for launchctl load|bootstrap or writes to LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist paths.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-service-persistence
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC655 — Claude settings command hook manipulates cron persistence

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit cron persistence setup.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for crontab mutation or writes to cron persistence paths.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-service-persistence
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC656 — Claude settings command hook registers a systemd service or unit for persistence

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit systemd service registration or unit-file writes.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for systemctl enable|link or writes to systemd unit paths.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-service-persistence
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC657 — Claude settings command hook registers a launchd plist for persistence

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit launchd registration or LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist writes.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for launchctl load|bootstrap or writes to LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist paths.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-service-persistence
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC658 — Plugin hook command manipulates cron persistence

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit cron persistence setup.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for crontab mutation or writes to cron persistence paths.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-service-persistence
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC659 — Plugin hook command registers a systemd service or unit for persistence

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit systemd service registration or unit-file writes.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for systemctl enable|link or writes to systemd unit paths.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-service-persistence
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC660 — Plugin hook command registers a launchd plist for persistence

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit launchd registration or LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist writes.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for launchctl load|bootstrap or writes to LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist paths.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-service-persistence
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC661 — Hook script performs an insecure permission change

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit insecure chmod payloads in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals shell-token analysis over non-comment hook lines for chmod 777, chmod 0777, or symbolic world-writable modes such as a+rwx.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-privilege-escalation-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC662 — Hook script manipulates setuid or setgid permissions

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit setuid or setgid chmod payloads in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals shell-token analysis over non-comment hook lines for chmod octal modes with setuid/setgid bits or symbolic modes such as u+s and g+s.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-privilege-escalation-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC663 — Hook script manipulates Linux capabilities

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit Linux capability manipulation payloads in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals shell-token analysis over non-comment hook lines for setcap or dangerous Linux capability tokens such as cap_setuid and cap_sys_admin.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-privilege-escalation-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC664 — MCP configuration command performs an insecure permission change

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit insecure chmod payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for chmod 777, chmod 0777, or symbolic world-writable modes such as a+rwx.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-privilege-escalation-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC665 — MCP configuration command manipulates setuid or setgid permissions

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit setuid or setgid chmod payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for chmod octal modes with setuid/setgid bits or symbolic modes such as u+s and g+s.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-privilege-escalation-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC666 — MCP configuration command manipulates Linux capabilities

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit Linux capability manipulation payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for setcap or dangerous Linux capability tokens such as cap_setuid and cap_sys_admin.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-privilege-escalation-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC667 — Claude settings command hook performs an insecure permission change

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit insecure chmod payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for chmod 777, chmod 0777, or symbolic world-writable modes such as a+rwx.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-privilege-escalation-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC668 — Claude settings command hook manipulates setuid or setgid permissions

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit setuid or setgid chmod payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for chmod octal modes with setuid/setgid bits or symbolic modes such as u+s and g+s.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-privilege-escalation-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC669 — Claude settings command hook manipulates Linux capabilities

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit Linux capability manipulation payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for setcap or dangerous Linux capability tokens such as cap_setuid and cap_sys_admin.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-privilege-escalation-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC670 — Plugin hook command performs an insecure permission change

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit insecure chmod payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for chmod 777, chmod 0777, or symbolic world-writable modes such as a+rwx.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-privilege-escalation-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC671 — Plugin hook command manipulates setuid or setgid permissions

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit setuid or setgid chmod payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for chmod octal modes with setuid/setgid bits or symbolic modes such as u+s and g+s.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-privilege-escalation-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC672 — Plugin hook command manipulates Linux capabilities

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit Linux capability manipulation payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for setcap or dangerous Linux capability tokens such as cap_setuid and cap_sys_admin.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-privilege-escalation-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC673 — Hook script posts secret material to a webhook endpoint

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit secret-bearing posts to well-known webhook endpoints in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for secret markers plus webhook endpoint markers such as hooks.slack.com/services/ or discord.com/api/webhooks/.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-webhook-secret-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC674 — MCP configuration command appears to send secret material over the network

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit secret-bearing network exfil payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for secret markers combined with network-capable command context.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-secret-exfil-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC675 — MCP configuration command sends secret material to an insecure http:// endpoint

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for secret-bearing exfil over insecure HTTP.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for http:// endpoints gated by concurrent secret markers in a network-capable command path.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-secret-exfil-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC676 — MCP configuration command posts secret material to a webhook endpoint

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for secret-bearing posts to webhook endpoints.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for secret markers plus webhook endpoint markers such as hooks.slack.com/services/ or discord.com/api/webhooks/.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-secret-exfil-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC677 — Claude settings command hook appears to send secret material over the network

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit secret-bearing network exfil payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for secret markers combined with network-capable command context.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-secret-exfil-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC678 — Claude settings command hook sends secret material to an insecure http:// endpoint

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for secret-bearing exfil over insecure HTTP.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for http:// endpoints gated by concurrent secret markers in a network-capable command path.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-secret-exfil-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC679 — Claude settings command hook posts secret material to a webhook endpoint

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for secret-bearing posts to webhook endpoints.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for secret markers plus webhook endpoint markers such as hooks.slack.com/services/ or discord.com/api/webhooks/.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-secret-exfil-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC680 — Plugin hook command appears to send secret material over the network

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit secret-bearing network exfil payloads.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for secret markers combined with network-capable command context.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-secret-exfil-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC681 — Plugin hook command sends secret material to an insecure http:// endpoint

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for secret-bearing exfil over insecure HTTP.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for http:// endpoints gated by concurrent secret markers in a network-capable command path.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-secret-exfil-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC682 — Plugin hook command posts secret material to a webhook endpoint

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for secret-bearing posts to webhook endpoints.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for secret markers plus webhook endpoint markers such as hooks.slack.com/services/ or discord.com/api/webhooks/.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-secret-exfil-payloads
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC683 — Hook script transfers a sensitive credential file to a remote destination

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit transfer of sensitive credential files to remote network or cloud-storage destinations in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for sensitive file paths such as .env, .aws/credentials, .ssh/id_rsa, or .kube/config combined with transfer commands like scp, sftp, rsync, curl, aws s3 cp, gsutil cp, or rclone copy.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-sensitive-file-exfil, hook-sensitive-file-rclone-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC684 — MCP configuration command transfers a sensitive credential file to a remote destination

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit transfer of sensitive credential files to remote destinations.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for sensitive file paths such as .env, .aws/credentials, .ssh/id_rsa, or .kube/config combined with transfer commands like scp, sftp, rsync, curl, aws s3 cp, gsutil cp, or rclone copy.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-sensitive-file-exfil, mcp-command-sensitive-file-rclone-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC685 — Claude settings command hook transfers a sensitive credential file to a remote destination

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit transfer of sensitive credential files to remote destinations.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for sensitive file paths such as .env, .aws/credentials, .ssh/id_rsa, or .kube/config combined with transfer commands like scp, sftp, rsync, curl, aws s3 cp, gsutil cp, or rclone copy.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-sensitive-file-exfil, claude-settings-hook-sensitive-file-rclone-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC686 — Plugin hook command transfers a sensitive credential file to a remote destination

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit transfer of sensitive credential files to remote destinations.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for sensitive file paths such as .env, .aws/credentials, .ssh/id_rsa, or .kube/config combined with transfer commands like scp, sftp, rsync, curl, aws s3 cp, gsutil cp, or rclone copy.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-sensitive-file-exfil, plugin-hook-command-sensitive-file-rclone-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC687 — Hook script reads local clipboard contents

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit clipboard-reading commands in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for clipboard read utilities such as pbpaste, wl-paste, xclip -o, xsel --output, or PowerShell Get-Clipboard.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-local-data-theft
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.
  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches direct access to browser credential or cookie storage files in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for browser profile paths such as Chrome or Firefox state directories paired with secret-store files like Cookies, Login Data, logins.json, key4.db, Web Data, or Local State.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-local-data-theft
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC689 — MCP configuration command reads local clipboard contents

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for clipboard-reading commands that can extract local user data.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for clipboard read utilities such as pbpaste, wl-paste, xclip -o, xsel --output, or PowerShell Get-Clipboard.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-local-data-theft
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.
  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for direct access to browser credential or cookie storage files.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for browser profile paths such as Chrome or Firefox state directories paired with secret-store files like Cookies, Login Data, logins.json, key4.db, Web Data, or Local State.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-local-data-theft
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC691 — Claude settings command hook reads local clipboard contents

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for clipboard-reading behavior that can extract local user data.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for clipboard read utilities such as pbpaste, wl-paste, xclip -o, xsel --output, or PowerShell Get-Clipboard.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-local-data-theft
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.
  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for direct access to browser credential or cookie storage files.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for browser profile paths such as Chrome or Firefox state directories paired with secret-store files like Cookies, Login Data, logins.json, key4.db, Web Data, or Local State.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-local-data-theft
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC693 — Plugin hook command reads local clipboard contents

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for clipboard-reading behavior that can extract local user data.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for clipboard read utilities such as pbpaste, wl-paste, xclip -o, xsel --output, or PowerShell Get-Clipboard.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-local-data-theft
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.
  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for direct access to browser credential or cookie storage files.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for browser profile paths such as Chrome or Firefox state directories paired with secret-store files like Cookies, Login Data, logins.json, key4.db, Web Data, or Local State.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-local-data-theft
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC695 — Hook script exfiltrates clipboard contents over the network

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches clipboard-reading commands that also transmit data to remote network endpoints in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for clipboard read utilities such as pbpaste, wl-paste, xclip -o, xsel --output, or PowerShell Get-Clipboard combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-local-data-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.
  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches direct access to browser credential or cookie storage files combined with remote transfer behavior in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for browser profile paths such as Chrome or Firefox state directories paired with secret-store files like Cookies, Login Data, logins.json, key4.db, Web Data, or Local State, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-local-data-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC697 — MCP configuration command exfiltrates clipboard contents over the network

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for clipboard-reading commands that also transmit captured data to remote destinations.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for clipboard read utilities such as pbpaste, wl-paste, xclip -o, xsel --output, or PowerShell Get-Clipboard combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-local-data-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.
  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for direct access to browser credential or cookie storage files combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for browser profile paths such as Chrome or Firefox state directories paired with secret-store files like Cookies, Login Data, logins.json, key4.db, Web Data, or Local State, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-local-data-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC699 — Claude settings command hook exfiltrates clipboard contents over the network

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for clipboard-reading behavior that also transmits captured data to remote destinations.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for clipboard read utilities such as pbpaste, wl-paste, xclip -o, xsel --output, or PowerShell Get-Clipboard combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-local-data-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.
  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for direct access to browser credential or cookie storage files combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for browser profile paths such as Chrome or Firefox state directories paired with secret-store files like Cookies, Login Data, logins.json, key4.db, Web Data, or Local State, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-local-data-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC701 — Plugin hook command exfiltrates clipboard contents over the network

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for clipboard reads that also transmit captured data to remote destinations.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for clipboard read utilities such as pbpaste, wl-paste, xclip -o, xsel --output, or PowerShell Get-Clipboard combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-local-data-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.
  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for direct access to browser credential or cookie storage files combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for browser profile paths such as Chrome or Firefox state directories paired with secret-store files like Cookies, Login Data, logins.json, key4.db, Web Data, or Local State, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-local-data-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC703 — Hook script captures a screenshot or desktop image

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit screen capture utilities in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for explicit screen capture utilities such as screencapture, scrot, gnome-screenshot, grim, maim, grimshot, ImageMagick import -window root, or PowerShell CopyFromScreen.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-screen-capture, hook-screen-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC704 — Hook script captures and exfiltrates a screenshot or desktop image

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit screen capture utilities combined with remote transfer behavior in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for explicit screen capture utilities such as screencapture, scrot, gnome-screenshot, grim, maim, grimshot, ImageMagick import -window root, or PowerShell CopyFromScreen, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-screen-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC705 — MCP configuration command captures a screenshot or desktop image

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit screen capture utilities.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for explicit screen capture utilities such as screencapture, scrot, gnome-screenshot, grim, maim, grimshot, ImageMagick import -window root, or PowerShell CopyFromScreen.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-screen-capture, mcp-command-screen-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC706 — MCP configuration command captures and exfiltrates a screenshot or desktop image

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit screen capture utilities combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for explicit screen capture utilities such as screencapture, scrot, gnome-screenshot, grim, maim, grimshot, ImageMagick import -window root, or PowerShell CopyFromScreen, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-screen-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC707 — Claude settings command hook captures a screenshot or desktop image

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit screen capture utilities.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for explicit screen capture utilities such as screencapture, scrot, gnome-screenshot, grim, maim, grimshot, ImageMagick import -window root, or PowerShell CopyFromScreen.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-screen-capture, claude-settings-hook-screen-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC708 — Claude settings command hook captures and exfiltrates a screenshot or desktop image

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit screen capture utilities combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for explicit screen capture utilities such as screencapture, scrot, gnome-screenshot, grim, maim, grimshot, ImageMagick import -window root, or PowerShell CopyFromScreen, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-screen-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC709 — Plugin hook command captures a screenshot or desktop image

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit screen capture utilities.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for explicit screen capture utilities such as screencapture, scrot, gnome-screenshot, grim, maim, grimshot, ImageMagick import -window root, or PowerShell CopyFromScreen.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-screen-capture, plugin-hook-command-screen-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC710 — Plugin hook command captures and exfiltrates a screenshot or desktop image

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit screen capture utilities combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for explicit screen capture utilities such as screencapture, scrot, gnome-screenshot, grim, maim, grimshot, ImageMagick import -window root, or PowerShell CopyFromScreen, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-screen-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC711 — Hook script captures a camera image or webcam stream

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit camera or webcam capture utilities in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for explicit camera capture utilities such as imagesnap, fswebcam, or ffmpeg with camera or video device selectors.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-device-capture, hook-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC712 — Hook script records microphone or audio input

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit microphone or audio-recording utilities in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for explicit audio capture utilities such as arecord, parecord, parec, rec, sox -d, or ffmpeg with microphone or audio device selectors.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-device-capture, hook-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC713 — Hook script captures and exfiltrates camera or webcam data

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit camera or webcam capture utilities combined with remote transfer behavior in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for explicit camera capture utilities such as imagesnap, fswebcam, or ffmpeg with camera or video device selectors, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC714 — Hook script records and exfiltrates microphone or audio input

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Matches explicit microphone or audio-recording utilities combined with remote transfer behavior in executable hook lines.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for explicit audio capture utilities such as arecord, parecord, parec, rec, sox -d, or ffmpeg with microphone or audio device selectors, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC715 — MCP configuration command captures a webcam or camera image

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit webcam or camera capture utilities.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for explicit camera capture utilities such as imagesnap, fswebcam, or ffmpeg with camera-oriented selectors like video=, /dev/video, -f v4l2, -f video4linux2, webcam, or camera.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-device-capture, mcp-command-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC716 — MCP configuration command captures microphone audio

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit microphone recording utilities.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for explicit microphone capture utilities such as arecord, parecord, parec, rec, sox -d, or ffmpeg with audio-oriented selectors like audio=, -f alsa, -f pulse, microphone, or mic.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-device-capture, mcp-command-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC717 — MCP configuration command captures and exfiltrates webcam or camera data

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit webcam or camera capture utilities combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for explicit camera capture utilities such as imagesnap, fswebcam, or ffmpeg with camera-oriented selectors like video=, /dev/video, -f v4l2, -f video4linux2, webcam, or camera, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC718 — MCP configuration command captures and exfiltrates microphone audio

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit microphone recording utilities combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for explicit microphone capture utilities such as arecord, parecord, parec, rec, sox -d, or ffmpeg with audio-oriented selectors like audio=, -f alsa, -f pulse, microphone, or mic, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC719 — Claude settings command hook captures a webcam or camera image

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit webcam or camera capture utilities.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for explicit camera capture utilities such as imagesnap, fswebcam, or ffmpeg with camera-oriented selectors like video=, /dev/video, -f v4l2, -f video4linux2, webcam, or camera.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-device-capture, claude-settings-hook-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC720 — Claude settings command hook captures microphone audio

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit microphone recording utilities.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for explicit microphone capture utilities such as arecord, parecord, parec, rec, sox -d, or ffmpeg with audio-oriented selectors like audio=, -f alsa, -f pulse, microphone, or mic.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-device-capture, claude-settings-hook-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC721 — Claude settings command hook captures and exfiltrates webcam or camera data

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit webcam or camera capture utilities combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for explicit camera capture utilities such as imagesnap, fswebcam, or ffmpeg with camera-oriented selectors like video=, /dev/video, -f v4l2, -f video4linux2, webcam, or camera, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC722 — Claude settings command hook captures and exfiltrates microphone audio

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit microphone recording utilities combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for explicit microphone capture utilities such as arecord, parecord, parec, rec, sox -d, or ffmpeg with audio-oriented selectors like audio=, -f alsa, -f pulse, microphone, or mic, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC723 — Plugin hook command captures a webcam or camera image

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit webcam or camera capture utilities.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for explicit camera capture utilities such as imagesnap, fswebcam, or ffmpeg with camera-oriented selectors like video=, /dev/video, -f v4l2, -f video4linux2, webcam, or camera.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-device-capture, plugin-hook-command-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC724 — Plugin hook command captures microphone audio

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit microphone recording utilities.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for explicit microphone capture utilities such as arecord, parecord, parec, rec, sox -d, or ffmpeg with audio-oriented selectors like audio=, -f alsa, -f pulse, microphone, or mic.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-device-capture, plugin-hook-command-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC725 — Plugin hook command captures and exfiltrates webcam or camera data

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit webcam or camera capture utilities combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for explicit camera capture utilities such as imagesnap, fswebcam, or ffmpeg with camera-oriented selectors like video=, /dev/video, -f v4l2, -f video4linux2, webcam, or camera, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC726 — Plugin hook command captures and exfiltrates microphone audio

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit microphone recording utilities combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for explicit microphone capture utilities such as arecord, parecord, parec, rec, sox -d, or ffmpeg with audio-oriented selectors like audio=, -f alsa, -f pulse, microphone, or mic, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-device-capture-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC727 — Hook script captures keystrokes or keyboard input

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks hook shell lines for explicit keystroke capture utilities or keylogger markers.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for explicit keylogger primitives such as logkeys, xinput test, evtest, showkey, PowerShell GetAsyncKeyState, or inline Python listener markers like pynput.keyboard.Listener.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-keylogger, hook-keylogger-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC728 — Hook script captures and exfiltrates keystrokes or keyboard input

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks hook shell lines for explicit keystroke capture utilities or keylogger markers combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for explicit keylogger primitives such as logkeys, xinput test, evtest, showkey, PowerShell GetAsyncKeyState, or inline Python listener markers like pynput.keyboard.Listener, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-keylogger-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC729 — MCP configuration command captures keystrokes or keyboard input

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit keystroke capture utilities or keylogger markers.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for explicit keylogger primitives such as logkeys, xinput test, evtest, showkey, PowerShell GetAsyncKeyState, or inline Python listener markers like pynput.keyboard.Listener.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-keylogger, mcp-command-keylogger-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC730 — MCP configuration command captures and exfiltrates keystrokes or keyboard input

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit keystroke capture utilities or keylogger markers combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for explicit keylogger primitives such as logkeys, xinput test, evtest, showkey, PowerShell GetAsyncKeyState, or inline Python listener markers like pynput.keyboard.Listener, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-keylogger-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC731 — Claude settings command hook captures keystrokes or keyboard input

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit keystroke capture utilities or keylogger markers.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for explicit keylogger primitives such as logkeys, xinput test, evtest, showkey, PowerShell GetAsyncKeyState, or inline Python listener markers like pynput.keyboard.Listener.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-keylogger, claude-settings-hook-keylogger-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC732 — Claude settings command hook captures and exfiltrates keystrokes or keyboard input

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit keystroke capture utilities or keylogger markers combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for explicit keylogger primitives such as logkeys, xinput test, evtest, showkey, PowerShell GetAsyncKeyState, or inline Python listener markers like pynput.keyboard.Listener, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-keylogger-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC733 — Plugin hook command captures keystrokes or keyboard input

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit keystroke capture utilities or keylogger markers.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for explicit keylogger primitives such as logkeys, xinput test, evtest, showkey, PowerShell GetAsyncKeyState, or inline Python listener markers like pynput.keyboard.Listener.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-keylogger, plugin-hook-command-keylogger-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC734 — Plugin hook command captures and exfiltrates keystrokes or keyboard input

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit keystroke capture utilities or keylogger markers combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for explicit keylogger primitives such as logkeys, xinput test, evtest, showkey, PowerShell GetAsyncKeyState, or inline Python listener markers like pynput.keyboard.Listener, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, rsync, nc, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-keylogger-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC735 — Hook script dumps environment variables or shell state

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks hook shell lines for explicit environment or shell-state enumeration commands.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for explicit environment enumeration primitives such as printenv, env used as a dump, export -p, declare -xp, or compgen -v.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-env-dump, hook-env-dump-exfil, hook-env-dump-cloud-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC736 — Hook script dumps and exfiltrates environment variables or shell state

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: hook
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Deny
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks hook shell lines for explicit environment or shell-state enumeration commands combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: HookSignals command-line analysis over non-comment hook lines for explicit environment enumeration primitives such as printenv, env used as a dump, export -p, declare -xp, or compgen -v, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, sftp, rsync, nc, aws s3 cp, gsutil cp, rclone copy, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: hook-env-dump-exfil, hook-env-dump-cloud-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: cursor-plugin-clean-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC737 — MCP configuration command dumps environment variables or shell state

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit environment or shell-state enumeration commands.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for explicit environment enumeration primitives such as printenv, env used as a dump, export -p, declare -xp, or compgen -v.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-env-dump, mcp-command-env-dump-exfil, mcp-command-env-dump-cloud-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC738 — MCP configuration command dumps and exfiltrates environment variables or shell state

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed MCP launch paths for explicit environment or shell-state enumeration commands combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for explicit environment enumeration primitives such as printenv, env used as a dump, export -p, declare -xp, or compgen -v, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, sftp, rsync, nc, aws s3 cp, gsutil cp, rclone copy, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: mcp-command-env-dump-exfil, mcp-command-env-dump-cloud-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: mcp-safe-basic
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC739 — Claude settings command hook dumps environment variables or shell state

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit environment or shell-state enumeration commands.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for explicit environment enumeration primitives such as printenv, env used as a dump, export -p, declare -xp, or compgen -v.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-env-dump, claude-settings-hook-env-dump-exfil, claude-settings-hook-env-dump-cloud-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC740 — Claude settings command hook dumps and exfiltrates environment variables or shell state

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: claude_settings
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, claude
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Claude settings command hooks for explicit environment or shell-state enumeration commands combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: ClaudeSettingsSignals command-hook string analysis over committed hook entries with type == command for explicit environment enumeration primitives such as printenv, env used as a dump, export -p, declare -xp, or compgen -v, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, sftp, rsync, nc, aws s3 cp, gsutil cp, rclone copy, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: claude-settings-hook-env-dump-exfil, claude-settings-hook-env-dump-cloud-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: claude-settings-network-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC741 — Plugin hook command dumps environment variables or shell state

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit environment or shell-state enumeration commands.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for explicit environment enumeration primitives such as printenv, env used as a dump, export -p, declare -xp, or compgen -v.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-env-dump, plugin-hook-command-env-dump-exfil, plugin-hook-command-env-dump-cloud-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC742 — Plugin hook command dumps and exfiltrates environment variables or shell state

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: base, mcp
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed plugin hook command values for explicit environment or shell-state enumeration commands combined with remote transfer behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals command-string analysis over ArtifactKind::CursorPluginHooks for explicit environment enumeration primitives such as printenv, env used as a dump, export -p, declare -xp, or compgen -v, combined with remote sinks such as curl, wget, scp, sftp, rsync, nc, aws s3 cp, gsutil cp, rclone copy, or HTTP(S) endpoints.
  • Malicious Corpus: plugin-hook-command-env-dump-exfil, plugin-hook-command-env-dump-cloud-exfil
  • Benign Corpus: plugin-hook-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC743 — package.json defines a dangerous install-time lifecycle script

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed package.json install-time lifecycle hooks for explicit download-exec, eval, or npm-explore shell behavior.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals package manifest analysis over scripts.preinstall|install|postinstall|prepare values for download-exec patterns, eval, or npm explore shell execution.
  • Malicious Corpus: package-manifest-dangerous-lifecycle-script
  • Benign Corpus: package-manifest-safe-lifecycle-script
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC744 — package.json installs a dependency from a git or forge shortcut source

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed package.json dependency sections for direct git or forge shortcut sources that bypass the normal registry release path.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals package manifest analysis over dependency sections for specs starting with git://, git+https://, git+ssh://, github:, gitlab:, or bitbucket:.
  • Malicious Corpus: package-manifest-git-url-dependency
  • Benign Corpus: package-manifest-registry-dependency-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC745 — package.json uses an unbounded dependency version like * or latest

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed package.json dependency sections for unbounded or mutable selectors that undermine reproducibility.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals package manifest analysis over dependency sections for exact specs equal to * or latest.
  • Malicious Corpus: package-manifest-unbounded-dependency
  • Benign Corpus: package-manifest-pinned-dependency-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC746 — Dockerfile RUN downloads remote code and executes it

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: dockerfile
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Dockerfiles for RUN instructions that fetch remote content and pipe it into a shell.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: DockerfileSignals line analysis over RUN instructions for download-exec patterns such as curl or wget piped to sh or bash.
  • Malicious Corpus: dockerfile-run-download-exec
  • Benign Corpus: dockerfile-safe-run
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC747 — Dockerfile final stage explicitly runs as root

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: dockerfile
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks the final Dockerfile stage for an explicit root runtime user while ignoring earlier build stages that later drop privileges.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: DockerfileSignals tracks FROM stage boundaries and the effective explicit USER in the final stage, flagging only root, root:*, 0, or 0:* in the last stage.
  • Malicious Corpus: dockerfile-final-stage-root-user
  • Benign Corpus: dockerfile-final-stage-nonroot-user
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC748 — Docker Compose service enables privileged container runtime or host namespace access

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: docker-compose
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Docker Compose service definitions for privileged runtime, dangerous capability grants, or host namespace access.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: DockerComposeSignals combines semantic confirmation of a Compose services map with indentation-aware line matching for privileged: true, cap_add: [ALL|SYS_ADMIN], and network_mode/pid/ipc: host inside service blocks.
  • Malicious Corpus: docker-compose-privileged-runtime
  • Benign Corpus: docker-compose-safe-runtime
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC749 — Dockerfile FROM uses a mutable registry image without a digest pin

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: dockerfile
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Dockerfiles for registry-distributed base images that are not digest pinned.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: DockerfileSignals exact FROM token analysis with conservative registry-image matching and digest-pin detection on the selected image token.
  • Malicious Corpus: dockerfile-mutable-base-image
  • Benign Corpus: dockerfile-digest-pinned-base-image
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC750 — Docker Compose service image uses a mutable registry reference without a digest pin

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: docker-compose
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Docker Compose services for registry-distributed image references that are not digest pinned.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: DockerComposeSignals combines semantic confirmation of services.*.image values with indentation-aware line matching and conservative registry-image plus digest-pin detection.
  • Malicious Corpus: docker-compose-mutable-image
  • Benign Corpus: docker-compose-digest-pinned-image
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC751 — Dockerfile FROM uses a latest or implicit-latest image tag

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: dockerfile
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Dockerfiles for base images that rely on latest or the implicit default latest tag.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: DockerfileSignals exact FROM token analysis with prior-stage alias tracking plus deterministic detection of explicit :latest tags or missing tags on non-digest image references.
  • Malicious Corpus: dockerfile-latest-base-image
  • Benign Corpus: dockerfile-tagged-base-image-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC752 — Docker Compose service image uses a latest or implicit-latest tag

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: docker-compose
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed Docker Compose services for images that rely on latest or the implicit default latest tag.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: DockerComposeSignals semantic services.*.image detection combined with indentation-aware line matching and deterministic detection of explicit :latest tags or missing tags on non-digest image references.
  • Malicious Corpus: docker-compose-latest-image
  • Benign Corpus: docker-compose-tagged-image-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC753 — package.json installs a dependency from a direct archive URL source

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: json
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed package.json dependency sections for direct archive URL sources that bypass the normal registry release path.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: JsonSignals package manifest analysis over dependency sections for direct http:// or https:// archive-like specs ending in .tgz, .tar.gz, .tar, .zip, or containing /tarball/.
  • Malicious Corpus: package-manifest-direct-url-dependency
  • Benign Corpus: package-manifest-registry-archive-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC754 — Devcontainer config defines a host-side initializeCommand

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: devcontainer
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed devcontainer configs for non-empty initializeCommand, which executes on the local host before container startup.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: DevcontainerSignals semantic JSON parsing plus exact value-span resolution for a non-empty top-level initializeCommand in .devcontainer.json or .devcontainer/devcontainer.json.
  • Malicious Corpus: devcontainer-initialize-command-host
  • Benign Corpus: devcontainer-no-initialize-command-safe
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

SEC755 — Devcontainer config bind-mounts sensitive local host material

  • Provider: lintai-ai-security
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: per_file
  • Surface: devcontainer
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Stable
  • Default Presets: supply-chain
  • Remediation: message_only
  • Lifecycle: stable_gated
  • Graduation Rationale: Checks committed devcontainer configs for bind mounts of sensitive local material such as SSH keys, cloud credentials, kubeconfig, or docker.sock.
  • Deterministic Signal Basis: DevcontainerSignals semantic JSON parsing plus exact value-span resolution for sensitive bind mounts in workspaceMount, mounts, or Docker-style runArgs mount flags.
  • Malicious Corpus: devcontainer-sensitive-bind-mount
  • Benign Corpus: devcontainer-safe-workspace-mount
  • Structured Evidence Required: true
  • Remediation Reviewed: true
  • Canonical Note: Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

Provider: lintai-policy-mismatch

SEC401 / POLICY-EXEC-MISMATCH — Project policy forbids execution, but repository contains executable behavior

  • Provider: lintai-policy-mismatch
  • Alias: POLICY-EXEC-MISMATCH
  • Scope: workspace
  • Surface: workspace
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: compat
  • Remediation: none
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Needs workspace-level precision review and linked graduation corpus before promotion to Stable.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs workspace precision review, linked benign/malicious corpus proof, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC402 / POLICY-NETWORK-MISMATCH — Project policy forbids network access, but repository contains network behavior

  • Provider: lintai-policy-mismatch
  • Alias: POLICY-NETWORK-MISMATCH
  • Scope: workspace
  • Surface: workspace
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: compat
  • Remediation: none
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Needs workspace-level network precision review and linked graduation corpus before promotion to Stable.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs workspace precision review, linked benign/malicious corpus proof, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

SEC403 / POLICY-SKILL-CAPABILITIES-MISMATCH — Skill frontmatter capabilities conflict with project policy

  • Provider: lintai-policy-mismatch
  • Alias: POLICY-SKILL-CAPABILITIES-MISMATCH
  • Scope: workspace
  • Surface: workspace
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: compat
  • Remediation: none
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Needs workspace-level capability-conflict precision review and linked graduation corpus before promotion to Stable.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs workspace precision review, linked benign/malicious corpus proof, and completed stable checklist metadata.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.

Provider: lintai-dep-vulns

SEC756 — Installed npm dependency version matches an offline vulnerability advisory

  • Provider: lintai-dep-vulns
  • Alias: none
  • Scope: workspace
  • Surface: workspace
  • Detection: structural
  • Default Severity: Warn
  • Public Lane: preview
  • Default Confidence: High
  • Tier: Preview
  • Default Presets: advisory
  • Remediation: suggestion
  • Lifecycle: preview_blocked
  • Promotion Blocker: Initial advisory snapshot coverage is intentionally small in the first release and needs broader snapshot discipline before Stable.
  • Promotion Requirements: Needs larger advisory snapshot coverage, cross-lockfile corpus proof, and stable review of package/version matching before promotion to Stable.
  • Canonical Note: Structural preview rule; deterministic today, but the preview contract may still evolve.