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Why It Matters
Privileged Docker examples in AI-native markdown are easy to copy into local execution without the surrounding caveats. Patterns like --privileged, host namespaces, or a docker.sock mount turn shared docs into operational guidance for container-to-host escape or host-level control.
Positioning
This is a context-sensitive preview rule. The detector points at real host-escape patterns, but infra debugging, security labs, and some ops runbooks may intentionally document them.
What Triggers
SEC349 applies only to AI-native markdown and triggers when a docker run example includes a host-escape or privileged runtime pattern such as:
--privileged--network host--pid host--ipc host- bind mounts or mounts of
/var/run/docker.sock
Examples that trigger:
text
docker run --privileged ghcr.io/acme/tool
docker run --network host ghcr.io/acme/tool
docker run -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock ghcr.io/acme/toolExamples that stay clean:
text
docker run qdrant/qdrant
docker run ghcr.io/acme/server@sha256:0123...False Positives
This rule remains Preview because security-lab or infra-debugging docs may intentionally show these commands. The detector is still valuable because it identifies real host-escape patterns, but the surrounding context can be legitimate and should be reviewed before escalation.
Remediation
Prefer examples without privileged flags, host namespaces, or docker.sock mounts. If the risky pattern is intentionally documented for lab use, label it explicitly as a dangerous exception instead of presenting it as a normal setup step.