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Rule Reference

SEC689lintai-ai-securitystablejsonwarn

MCP config: clipboard read

MCP configuration command reads local clipboard contents

Provider
lintai-ai-security
Surface
json
Scope
per_file
Tier
stable
Severity
warn
Confidence
high
Detection
structural
Remediation
message_only

Activation Model

Preset Membership

This rule is part of the builtin activation graph through these preset memberships.

basemembership
mcpmembership

Lifecycle

Stable Lifecycle Contract

State

stable_gated

Graduation rationale

Checks committed MCP launch paths for clipboard-reading commands that can extract local user data.

Deterministic signal basis

JsonSignals command-plus-args analysis over ArtifactKind::McpConfig for clipboard read utilities such as `pbpaste`, `wl-paste`, `xclip -o`, `xsel --output`, or PowerShell `Get-Clipboard`.

Malicious corpus
mcp-command-local-data-theft
Benign corpus
mcp-safe-basic
structured evidence required remediation reviewed
Canonical note

Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

Nearby Signals

Related Rules

SEC301MCP config: shell trampolineMCP configuration shells out through sh -c or bash -cjsonstable
SEC302Config: insecure HTTP endpointConfiguration contains an insecure http:// endpointjsonstable
SEC303MCP config: credential env passthroughMCP configuration passes through credential environment variablesjsonstable
SEC304Config: TLS verification disabledConfiguration disables TLS or certificate verificationjsonstable
SEC305Config: hardcoded auth materialConfiguration embeds static authentication material in a connection or auth valuejsonstable
SEC309Config: literal secrets in configConfiguration commits literal secret material in env, auth, or header valuesjsonstable

Why It Matters ​

An MCP launcher that reads the local clipboard can silently extract copied secrets or internal data whenever the tool is invoked.

What Triggers ​

SEC689 matches committed MCP command paths that invoke clipboard-reading utilities such as pbpaste, wl-paste, xclip -o, xsel --output, or PowerShell Get-Clipboard.

False Positives ​

Committed MCP launchers should not rely on hidden clipboard access. If clipboard input is really needed, it should happen through explicit user interaction rather than a shared committed command.

Remediation ​

Remove clipboard reads from the committed MCP launch path and require explicit input instead of harvesting local clipboard state.