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Rule Reference

SEC575lintai-ai-securitystablejsonwarn

MCP config: Write unsafe path auto-approve

MCP configuration auto-approves `Write(...)` over an unsafe path through `autoApprove`

Provider
lintai-ai-security
Surface
json
Scope
per_file
Tier
stable
Severity
warn
Confidence
high
Detection
structural
Remediation
message_only

Activation Model

Preset Membership

This rule is part of the builtin activation graph through these preset memberships.

basemembership
mcpmembership

Lifecycle

Stable Lifecycle Contract

State

stable_gated

Graduation rationale

Matches exact unsafe-path `Write(...)` auto-approval in MCP client config.

Deterministic signal basis

JsonSignals exact array-item predicate detection for `autoApprove` entries where `Write(...)` targets an absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified path.

Malicious corpus
mcp-autoapprove-unsafe-path-family
Benign corpus
mcp-autoapprove-unsafe-path-family-specific-safe
structured evidence required remediation reviewed
Canonical note

Structural stable rule intended as a high-precision check with deterministic evidence.

Nearby Signals

Related Rules

SEC301MCP config: shell trampolineMCP configuration shells out through sh -c or bash -cjsonstable
SEC302Config: insecure HTTP endpointConfiguration contains an insecure http:// endpointjsonstable
SEC303MCP config: credential env passthroughMCP configuration passes through credential environment variablesjsonstable
SEC304Config: TLS verification disabledConfiguration disables TLS or certificate verificationjsonstable
SEC305Config: hardcoded auth materialConfiguration embeds static authentication material in a connection or auth valuejsonstable
SEC309Config: literal secrets in configConfiguration commits literal secret material in env, auth, or header valuesjsonstable

SEC575 / MCP-AUTOAPPROVE-WRITE-UNSAFE-PATH ​

SEC575 flags MCP configuration when autoApprove includes Write(...) with an absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified path.

Why It Matters ​

Unsafe Write(...) scopes allow broad mutation outside project-scoped expectations. Auto-approving them removes review from high-impact file changes.

Trigger Shape ​

  • the file is a detected MCP configuration surface
  • autoApprove is a string array
  • an entry matches Write(...)
  • the inner path is absolute, home-relative, parent-traversing, or drive-qualified

How To Fix ​

Replace unsafe Write(...) auto-approval with repository-scoped allowlists or remove it from shared auto-approval.